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ABSTRACT
Felemban, Muhamad PhD, Purdue University, August 2018. Design and Development
of Adaptive Intrusion Management for Cyber-Based Systems. Major Professor: Arif
Ghafoor.
With the growing Cyber-security threats to governmental and organizational infrastructures, the need to develop high resilient Cyber-Based Systems (CBSs) that
preserve the security of data is becoming increasingly important. A prominent type
of Cyber-attacks is intrusion attacks that aim at data tampering, which can impair
the conﬁdentiality and the integrity of data. Therefore, it is imperative to design a
holistic intrusion management approach for CBSs.
In this dissertation, we address the challenges of designing and developing a resilient intrusion management system. In particular, we propose an adaptive data
Partitioning-based Intrusion Management System (PIMS) that can endure intense
malicious intrusion attacks on Database Management Systems (DBMSs). The novelty
of PIMS is a data partitioning scheme that provides the ability to contain the damage
in conﬁned partitions. We formulate the demarcation problem as a dual-objective optimization problem and prove that it is NP-hard. Accordingly, we propose two heuristic solutions for the problem. Furthermore, PIMS incorporates a novel partition-based
response and recovery mechanisms, which executes compensating transactions to automatically repair the damage caused by the intrusion attacks. Then, we consider
access-controlled skewed workload, in which the transactions are executed based on
a speciﬁed access control policy and the data objects are accessed non-uniformly.
We formulate the related demarcation problem and propose two heuristics. The new
problem has signiﬁcantly less number of variables as compared to the original demarcation problem. We present a Malicious Transaction Benchmark (MTB) to evaluate

xiv
the performance of the proposed intrusion management systems. The novelty of the
MTB is the ability to generate transactional workload and to orchestrate various
attacking scenarios.
Then, we extend the functionality of PIMS to design a time-aware Threat Management System (TMS) for Data-driven IoT-based Collaborative Systems (DIoTCS).
The novelty of the TMS is conﬁning the damage into partitions based on the execution
time-constraints speciﬁed by the DIoTCS applications. We model the execution timeconstraints of the DIoTCS applications and then formulate the partitioning problem
as a cost-driven optimization problem. We prove that the partitioning problem is
NP-hard and accordingly propose two eﬃcient heuristics. We evaluate the TMS using the MTB and demonstrate that intelligent data-partitioning improves the overall
availability of the DIoTCS.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
Data-intensive applications exhibit increasing reliance on Cyber-Based Systems (CBSs),
such as Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet-of-things (IoT). Examples of these applications are abound in the domain of intelligent transportations [1], smart grids [2],
smart cities [3], health care [4], and enterprise applications [5]. With the growing
Cyber-security threats to governmental and organizational infrastructures, the need
to develop high resilient CBSs that preserve the security of data is becoming increasingly important [6, 7]. Although research in database security has made signiﬁcant
progress in preventing and mitigating Cyber-attacks, applications can still have large
attack surface. Intrusion attacks are among the most fatal attacks that aim at data
tampering, which can impair the conﬁdentiality and the integrity of data [8]. Even
a single intrusion attack can cause catastrophic cascading failures and performance
degradation due to data dependency and application interoperability in CBSs.
A prominent solution to intrusion attacks is the Intrusion Detection System (IDS),
which is often integrated with CBSs to prevent Cyber-attacks. The objective of the
IDS is to monitor and detect illegal accesses and malicious actions that take place in
diﬀerent components of the CBS. However, the IDSs are not designed to repair the
damages caused by successful attacks. Therefore, it is imperative to design a holistic
approach for intrusion management that provides intrusion detection, intrusion response, and intrusion recovery services for CBSs [9, 10]. In this dissertation, we focus
on the design and development of an intrusion management tool for the Database
Management Systems (DBMSs) in the CBSs.

2
DBA

Time
14:05:34
14:05:37
14:05:39
14:06:04

User
A
(Malicious)
B
C
DBA

14:06:15
14:08:24

D
DBA

Transaction
Updates account X = X +100
Updates account Y = Y - 200
Withdraws from account X
Withdraws from account Y
Shuts down DB and starts
transaction recovery procedure
Blocked from checking account Z
Malicious transaction recovered

Incorrect balance
A

C
Banking
Database
D

B
Incorrect balance

System is down

Fig. 1.1. Motivating example.

1.1

Motivation
Figure 1.1 gives an example scenario of a Banking system with three benign users

(B,C, and D), and a malevolent user (A). User A executes a malicious transaction
that updates accounts X and Y with incorrect amounts of money as illustrated in the
table of Figure 1.1. Then, users B and C attempt to withdraw from accounts X and
Y , respectively. The IDS detects the malicious transaction executed by user A and
triggers an alert to the database security administrator, who temporarily blocks the
incoming transactions and starts the recovery procedure. Meanwhile, user D attempts
to access account Z. However, this request is denied until the database is recovered.
When the recovery procedure is ﬁnished, the damaged accounts are compensated,
i.e., deducting 100 from account X and adding 200 to account Y .
In the above example, the recovery time depends on the number of transactions
that are executed before the IDS detects the malicious transaction, i.e., long recovery procedure degrades the availability of the DBMS (and consequently the CBS).
Therefore, it is important to contain the damage once the malicious transaction is
detected. Improving the availability of the DBMS can be achieved by tracking the
inter-transaction dependencies and devising a fast conﬁnement strategy to contain
the damage. Several eﬀorts have been directed towards developing dynamic damage
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tracking to perform on-the-ﬂy damage repair [10, 11]. However, such systems have
limitations in the ability to maintain high availability under severe intrusion attacks.
One of the limitations is the prolonged recovery time when the transactions are highly
dependent.

1.2

Research Contributions
In this dissertation, we address the challenges of the design and development of a

holistic online approach for intrusion management in CBSs. In particular, we make
the following three research contributions.
Partition-Based Intrusion Management for Database Management Systems 1 : A new real-time intrusion management architecture for DBMSs, termed
Partition-based Intrusion Management System (PIMS), is presented. PIMS is based
on an adaptive access and admission control mechanism that responds to intrusions by
selectively blocking segments of data that have been aﬀected by the intrusion attacks.
The main contributions of PIMS are as the following. First, we introduce a new transaction dependency graph, termed Data Dependency Graph (DDG), that models the
inter-transaction and intra-transaction dependencies among the data objects. Second,
we propose the concept of Intrusion Boundary (IB) that deﬁnes the extent of damage
by demarcating the transactions in DDG into overlapping partitions. Accordingly, we
formulate the IB demarcation as a multi-objective optimization problem. We prove
that the IB demarcation problem is NP-hard and introduce two heuristics to provide
1

1. Muhamad Felemban, Yahya Javed, Thamir Qadah, Walid Aref, Arif Ghafoor. ”Design
and Evaluation of Data Partitioning-Based Intrusion Management Architecture for Database
Systems”. Submitted to IEEE Trans. on Know. and Data Eng. on February 2018.
2. Muhamad Felemban, Anas Daghistani, Yahya Javed, Arif Ghafoor. ”Security and Performance Design for Cloud Data Centers”. Submitted to IEEE Cloud Computing. on March
2018.
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a polynomial time solution. Finally, we introduce the intrusion response and recovery
mechanisms that use the generated IB assignment to improve the performance of the
attacked DBMS in terms of availability and damage containment.
Integrated Access Control and Hotspot Model for Intrusion Management: We extend the functionality of PIMS for access-controlled skewed transactional workload. In particular, we consider access-controlled workload, in which the
transactions are aggregated into access control roles. In addition, we model hotspot
objects in the workload to address the workload skewness problem, i.e., non-uniform
access to objects. We formulate the Access Control and Hotspot Demarcation Problem (ACHDP) as an optimization problem, which has signiﬁcantly less number of
variables as compared to IBDP. Accordingly, we propose eﬃcient heuristics to solve
the problem in polynomial times. Finally, we introduce the hotspot synchronization
module and integrate it to PIMS’s architecture in order to provide faster recovery
procedure for hotspot objects using a backup table.
Execution Time-Aware Partition-Based Intrusion Management System
for Data-Centric IoT Collaborative Systems 2 : We integrate PIMS with Datacentric IoT-based Collaborative Systems (DIoTCS) to form a Threat Management
System (TMS) that counters the data tampering attacks on such collaborative systems. We introduce a new model, termed Time-constraint Transaction Execution
Graph (TTEG), that captures the dependencies and execution time-constraints among
transactions in the DIoTCS. Then, we propose the concept of Containment Regions
(CRs) that deﬁnes the extent of damage over the globally-shared data in the DIoTCS.
We formulate the problem of CR Demarcation Problem (CRDP) as a multi-objective
optimization problem and prove that the it is NP-hard. Accordingly, we propose two
eﬃcient heuristics to provide a solution in polynomial time.
2

Muhamad Felemban, Emad Felemban, Arif Ghafoor. ”A Threat Management System for

Data-Centric IoT-Based Collaborative Systems”. Submitted to ACM Trans. of Internet Tech. on
January 2018.
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Design and Development of Malicious Transactions Benchmark: We
present a novel Malicious Transactions Benchmark (MTB) framework to evaluate
the performance of intrusion management systems in the CBSs. The MTB provides
the ability to generate transactional workload, orchestrate intrusion attack scenarios,
execute the transactional workload, and collect performance metrics. We have used
the MTB to evaluate PIMS and TMS under various experimental contexts.

1.3

Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides rel-

evant background concepts and related work. The problem of intrusion management
in database systems is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the problem of
intrusion management in access-controlled skewed data. In Chapter 5, the problem of
intrusion management in time-constrained IoT-based systems is presented. Chapter
6 concludes the dissertation with suggestions for future work.
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we present the database and transaction model, the access control
model, and threat model that are used in this dissertation. In addition, an overview
of the related work is presented in this chapter.

2.1

Database and Transaction Model
A database is a set of n objects denoted by D = {o1 , o2 , . . . , on }, where oi refers

to an object. A transaction ti is a partially ordered set of operations, with a partial
ordering relation <i [12]. The read and write (update) operations of ti on an object,
say o ∈ D, are denoted by ri [o] and wi [o], respectively. The set of objects that are read
and updated by a transaction ti are denoted by Ri and Wi , respectively. Formally, ti
is deﬁned as follows [12]:
1. ti ⊆ {wi [o], ri [o]|o ∈ D} ∪ {ai , ci }
2. if wi [o], ri [o] ∈ ti , then either wi [o] <i ri [o] or ri [o] <i wi [o]
/ ti , and
3. ai ∈ ti if and only if ci ∈
4. for any operation p ∈ ti , p <i t where t is either ai or ci (whichever in ti )
where ai and ci denote the abort and commit operations of ti , respectively. In words,
Condition (1) deﬁnes the types of operations in ti . Condition (2) requires that the
order of execution of read and write operations on an object is speciﬁed by <i . Condition (3) states that ti either contains a commit or an abort operation, while Condition
(4) states that commit (or abort) must follow all other operations.
For a set of m transactions T = {t1 , t2 , ..., tm }, a complete history H over T is
a partially ordered set with the partial ordering relation <H , where H = ∪m
i=1 ti and
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(a) Transaction history H1

(b) Precedence graph

Fig. 2.1. Transaction history and precedence graph.

<H ⊇ ∪ m
i=1 <i . In other words, the execution history represented by H involves all
transactions in T and matches all operation orderings that are speciﬁed within each
transaction. Two transactions, say ti and tj , in H are dependent if (i) ti is directly
followed by tj , i.e., ti <H tj , and (ii) Wti ∩ Rtj 6= ∅. The dependency between ti and
tj is denoted by ti → tj and reads ”tj depends on ti ”. In general, tj depends on ti
if (i) ti <H tk1 <H . . . <H tkn <H tj , and (ii) (Wti − ∪l=1,..,n Wtkl ) ∩ Rtj =
6 ∅. This
indirect dependency is represented as ti →∝ tj .
The transactions dependencies among T in the history H is modeled using the
Precedence Graph (PG) [12], which is a directed graph P G = {V, E}, where V is a
set of nodes; each node representing a committed transaction in H, and E is a set of
edges; each edge representing a dependency between two transactions, i.e., an edge
between two transactions ti and tj exists if tj depends on ti .
Example 2.1.1 Consider History H1 over T = {t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 } in Figure 2.1(a). H1 ’s
corresponding PG is depicted in Figure 2.1(b). In the ﬁgure, t2 depends on t1 because
t1 updates o2 that is later read by t2 . Similarly, t3 depends on t1 and t4 depends on
t3 .
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Fig. 2.2. Example of RBAC permission assignment.

2.2

Role-Based Access Control Model
The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policy deﬁnes the permissions on objects

based on business roles in an organization. The policy is composed of a set of Users
(U ), a set of Roles (R), a set of Permissions (P ), user-to-role assignment relation
(U A), and a role-to-permission assignment relation (P A). An RBAC access control
policy for a datacenter deﬁnes the permissions to access data objects for the roles.
Given an RBAC policy P for a datacenter, where R is the set of roles and O is the
set of data objects, P A can be represented as a directed bipartite graph G(V, E),
where V = R ∪ O s.t. R ∩ O = φ. The edges eri oj ∈ E in G represents the existence
of role-to-permission assignment, i.e., (ri × oj ) ∈ P A, in the RBAC policy P, where
ri ∈ R and oj ∈ O. A leading practical system that uses RBAC is the Virtual Private
Database (VPD) on Oracle [13] and Row Level Security (RLS) in PostgreSQL [14].

2.3

Threat Model
In this dissertation, we focus on data corruptions caused by transaction-level in-

trusion attacks in the DBMS. These attacks are possible either through masquerade
access or by exploiting application vulnerabilities, e.g., SQL injection, Cross Site
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Scripting (XSS), and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [15]. A transaction, say tm ,
is malicious if it updates one or more objects with incorrect data. In this context, a
malicious transaction corrupts the data objects due to either an attack or a user fault.
A transaction, say ta , is aﬀected if ta directly (or indirectly) depends on a malicious
transaction, i.e., tm → ta (or tm →∝ ta ). All malicious and aﬀected transactions are
invalid transactions. The execution of an invalid transaction takes the DBMS into an
invalid state. For example, assume that transaction t1 in Figure 2.1(b) is malicious.
Then, both t2 and t3 are aﬀected transactions. We assume that a malicious transaction does not depend on other transactions, i.e., a malicious transaction cannot be
an aﬀected transaction. Furthermore, we assume that we can undo the operations
performed by the committed transactions.
We rely on the IDS to detect and identify the malicious transactions within certain
detection delay, denoted by Δ [16, 17]. Note that the IDS alarm is received after the
malicious transaction commits. Furthermore, we assume that the presence of an
access control policy is suﬃcient to prevent any conﬁdentiality attacks and that there
are security countermeasures to prevent other availability attacks, e.g., Denial-ofService (DoS) [18].

2.4

Related Work

2.4.1

Database Security

Securing the CBSs involves the protection of the conﬁdentiality, the integrity, and
the availability of data [8]. The loss of data conﬁdentiality is the disclosure of sensitive
information to unauthorized personnel. The loss of data integrity is deﬁned as the
unauthorized changes of data either intentionally or accidentally, whereas the loss of
availability is the loss of system’s functionality. A broad span of research addresses
the loss of data conﬁdentiality in the CBSs including work on authorization [19–21],
access control [13, 22–26], encryption [27–29], and inference and disclosure control
[30–33]. The data integrity risks in DBMS are jointly prevented by employing access
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control mechanisms and semantic integrity constraints to verify the correctness of
the database state after update operations [7, 34]. Encryption-based techniques [35],
secure communications [36], trust management [37], and data possession protocol [38]
are used to detect and prevent data corruption. The availability of data is ensured
by providing fault-tolerance techniques [39], recovery procedures [12, 40], and IDSs
[41,42]. The work in this dissertation is aligned with the work on protecting the data
integrity and availability against malicious intrusion attacks in the CBSs.
The IDS is an important tool that can be integrated with any comprehensive security solution with the objective to monitor and detect illicit accesses and malicious
actions in the DBMSs. The existing methodologies detection can be broadly classiﬁed
into two groups: signature-based detection and anomaly detection. In signature-based
detection approach, the IDS looks for attack patterns in the logs using data mining techniques [43–46]. This approach works eﬀectively against well-known attacks.
However, it is incapable of detecting emerging types of attacks. On the other hand,
the IDS that uses anomaly detection approach looks for deviations in normal user behavior [16, 17]. Consequently, it is capable of detecting unexpected emerging attack
patterns. Although the IDS can prevent future access of attackers, it is not able to
perform attack response and recovery that mitigate the risk of successful intrusion
attacks. Moreover, the IDSs suﬀer from long detection delay as well as high falsealarm rate that can cause negative impact on the integrity and availability of the
DBMSs [18].

2.4.2

Malicious Transactions Recovery

Traditional DBMS recovery mechanisms guarantee the Atomicity, Consistency,
Isolation, and Durability (ACID) properties of transactions [12]. The atomicity property guarantees that the database modiﬁcations follow an ”all or nothing” rule, i.e.,
either all the tasks of a transaction are performed or none of them are performed
at all. The consistency property ensures that the database remains in a consistent
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state wether the transaction has been committed or aborted. The isolation property
requires that operations cannot read or update data objects in an intermediate state.
The durability property ensures that the results of all committed transactions are
never lost.
In the context of intrusion attacks, a committed malicious transaction may cause
undesirable inappropriate activities. This problem arises due to the delayed detection
of a malicious transaction in the DBMS [16, 17]. Note that if the IDS detects the
malicious transaction before it commits, then cascading abort of the uncommitted
malicious transaction is suﬃcient [12]. However, cascading abort does not capture
the read-from relation between two committed transactions and thus is not suitable
for committed malicious transaction recovery.
In general, handling the recovery of malicious transactions requires undoing the
committed malicious and aﬀected transactions. There are two common approaches to
undo a committed transaction: rollback and compensation. The rollback approach is
to roll back all the operations performed by the committed transaction to a point that
is free of damage. Checkpoints in the DBMS serve a similar function that provides a
stable, consistent snapshots of the database [40]. Although the rollback approach is
eﬀective in terms of wiping out the damage, it is expensive as all the desirable work
between the backup (checkpoint) time and the time when recovery starts is lost. One
solution to reduce the cost is maintaining frequent checkpoints using algorithms that
eﬃciently establish on-the-ﬂy snapshots of the database [47].
On the other hand, the compensation approach seeks to selectively undo committed transactions without rolling back the entire state of the DBMS into a previous
state [48]. There are two types of compensation: action-oriented and eﬀect-oriented.
The action-oriented approach compensates the action (or set of actions) performed
by the committed transaction [48]. On the other hand, the eﬀect-oriented approach
compensates the actions performed by the committed transaction and all actions
performed by the subsequent transactions [49]. Our work follows an eﬀect-oriented
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compensation approach to recover the damage caused by the malicious transactions
and the subsequent aﬀected transactions.
Several solutions have been proposed to provide intrusion recovery for databasebacked applications. A generic intrusion-tolerant architecture for web-servers that
uses redundancy and diversiﬁcation principles is proposed in [50]. The proposed architecture is composed of multiple redundant proxies that mediate the clients’ requests
to a group of diversiﬁed servers in order to increase the system availability and integrity. In [51], authors propose WARP to recover from intrusions in web-applications
by rolling back the database and replaying subsequent legitimate actions to correct
the state of the DBMS. In [52], an intrusion recovery tool for database-backed applications running in Platform-as-a-Service clouds is proposed. The tool uses machine
learning techniques to associate the application requests to the DBMS statements,
and then uses existing recovery algorithms to recover the damage in the DBMS. Our
work is designed as a middle-layer between the DBMS and the application in order
to perform automatic intrusion response and recovery in the DBMS independently
from the running applications.
There exist work on intrusion recovery for the DBMSs including the work [10,
11, 53, 54]. In [53], a damage assessment and repair system, called Phoenix, is proposed. The core component in Phoenix is the inter-transaction dependency tracking
that maintains persistent dependency information at run-time. In [54], a damage
assessment technique using data dependency analysis is proposed to obtain a precise information about the set of corrupted data. The work in this dissertation is
relevant to the work in [10, 11] that proposes a real-time approach to track the intertransaction dependency, mark the aﬀected transactions, and repair the damage. The
recovery is performed in two stages: damage assessment and damage repair. In the
damage assessment stage, the set of aﬀected transactions is identiﬁed. This stage is
challenging because that the assessment is conducted on-the-ﬂy while the system is
processing other concurrent transactions. Due to inter-transaction dependency, the
damage might be spreading by executing dependent transaction during the recovery
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procedure. In such case, the damage assessment is terminated whenever there are no
more transactions that can cause further spread of the damage. Once the damage
assessment stage is completed, all the identiﬁed aﬀected transactions are repaired by
rolling them back without aﬀecting the other transactions in the system. Our work
is diﬀerent than [10, 11] in the damage assessment stage. In particular, the damage
is aggressively terminated by stopping the execution of the concurrent transactions
momentarily during the damage assessment process. Moreover, we adopt data partitioning scheme that provides a proactive damage conﬁnement mechanism to prevent
the spread of the damage into the entire database.

2.4.3

Database Partitioning

Data partitioning is often used to improve the scalability of the DBMSs by leveraging the distributed architecture to process data in parallel. Moreover, data partitioning improves the system availability by providing the ability to run transactions
on active partitions without being aﬀected by failed ones. Standard partitioning
schemes that have been proposed in the literature include round-robin, range partitioning, and hash partitioning [55]. However, the cost of distribution using the above
partitioning techniques is deemed to be expensive with transactions of small size.
Therefore, more intelligent partitioning schemes have been proposed in the literature
to overcome speciﬁc workload-related concerns. The work on data partitioning in
online transaction processing systems can be broadly categorized into oﬄine [56, 57]
and online partitioning [58–60].
Curino et al. [56] have evaluated the aforementioned partitioning schemes by executing small transactions in a distributed system and showed that the throughput is
signiﬁcantly worse than executing them on a single node. Accordingly, a workloadaware system for partitioning data, called Schism, is proposed. In Schism, the data
objects are modeled as a graph, which is then partitioned into k balanced partitions
with the objective to minimize the number of distributed transactions. Along with the
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partitioning scheme, Schisms automatically decides on when to replicate infrequent
data. A major concern with Schism is the scalability of the partitioning schema.
To mitigate the scalability at the design level, Quamar et al. [57] have proposed a
scalable workload-aware data placement, called SWORD, that uses hypergraph compression techniques to deal with enormous datasets. In addition, an incremental
repartitioning is used to address the disparity of run-time workload and workload
used in initial partitioning. Similar to Schism, SWORD provides data replication to
increases performance and availability.
Workload skewness, e.g., hot spots, time-varying skew, and load spikes, can radically impair the performance of the partitioning schemes. Therefore, adaptive online
partitioning techniques are used to partition data in skewed workload. Taft et al. [58]
have proposed E-store, an elastic planning and reconﬁguration system that mitigates
the challenges paired with skewed workload. E-store automatically scales resources
when the application’s workload is undergoing demand spikes, periodic events, and
gradual changes by employing a two-tier data placement strategy: cold data is distributed in large chunks, while hot data are assigned explicitly to individual nodes.
Seraﬁni et al. have proposesd Clay, which models the database as a graph of vertices
that represent data objects [59]. The co-accesses between objects are modeled using
edges among vertices, with weights representing the frequency of the co-access. Partitions are created with the objective to minimize the distributed transactions and
to maximize load balancing. Furthermore, on-line repartitioning is guided by minimizing the number of blocks, called clumps, that need to be migrated. In [60], an
execution time-aware online partitioning, called SOAP, is proposed. SOAP aims to
minimize the time frame of executing the repartitioning operations while achieving
correctness and performance of concurrent transaction processing. The scheduling of
repartition operations is controlled by determining the order and the frequency at
which the operation should be scheduled. All the above work consider partitioning
the data in order to improve the scalability and performance of the DBMS. However,
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in this dissertation, we consider data partitioning to improve the security measures
of the DBMS, i.e., availability and integrity.
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3. PARTITION-BASED INTRUSION MANAGEMENT
ARCHITECTURE FOR DATABASE SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we present a data partition-based intrusion management architecture
for database systems. First, we introduce the deﬁnition, the formulation, the hardness
proof of the demarcation problem, and present two heuristics to solve the problem
in polynomial time. Then, we introduce the intrusion management architecture and
provide detailed discussions about its components. Finally, we present and discuss
the performance evaluation results.

3.1

Intrusion Boundary Demarcation
In this section, we present a new data-level model to represent inter-transaction

and intra-transaction dependencies. Then, we deﬁne the IB demarcation problem and
formulate it as a cost-driven optimization problem. Finally, we prove the hardness of
the problem.

3.1.1

Data Dependency Graph

There are two approaches to trace the damage caused by malicious transactions:
the inter-transaction dependency approach [10] and the data (intra-transaction) dependency approach [54]. The intra-transaction dependency refers to the read/write
dependency among data objects resulted from executing the operations of the transaction. In essence, two objects, say oi and oj , are dependent if there exists a transaction,
say tk , that reads oi and updates oj . Two transactions, say tk and t` , are dependent
if t` reads an object that has been previously updated by tk . For example, in Figure
3.1, object o2 depends on o1 while o4 depends on o3 . Notice that transactions t2 and
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Fig. 3.1. Data dependency graph of transaction history H1 .

t3 depend on t1 because they read o2 and o4 , respectively. If t1 only corrupts o2 , then
t2 is aﬀected and o5 is potentially corrupted. However, t3 is not aﬀected because o4 is
not corrupted by t1 . The PG can be used to trace the propagation of inter-transaction
damages, but not the intra-transaction data dependency. In particular, using the PG
(Figure 2.1(b)) to trace the damage in such scenario incorrectly identiﬁes t2 and t3 as
aﬀected under the assumption that if a transaction is malicious then all its objects
are corrupted.
To address the limitation of the PG, we introduce a ﬁne-grained dependency
model, termed Data Dependency Graph (DDG), that allows tracing intra and intertransaction dependencies simultaneously. The formal deﬁnition of DDG is as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1.1 (DDG) A DDG is a triple < D, E, T >, where D is the set of
objects in the database, E is a set of directed edges among objects, and T is a set of
transactions. A direct edge eij ∈ E between two objects, oi and oj , exists if there is
a transaction, t ∈ T that reads oi and updates oj . A transaction t is a subgraph that
contains a set of objects and edges, i.e., t ⊆ DDG. The same edge eij can be shared
among multiple transactions that read oi and update oj .
Figure 3.1 depicts the DDG for H1 shown in Figure 2.1(a), where a transaction
is shown as dashed rectangles that groups all the objects it accesses along with the
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dependency edges. There are two types of objects in the DDG: internal and shared
objects.
Deﬁnition 3.1.2 (Internal object) An object, say o ∈ D, is deﬁned as an internal
object if o is read or written by a single transaction. The set of internal objects in a
transaction, say t, is denoted by I(t).
for example, the sets of internal objects for each transaction in Figure 3.1 are I(t1 ) =
{o1 , o3 }, I(t2 ) = {o5 }, I(t3 ) = {o6 }, and I(t4 ) = {o8 }. The set of internal objects in
the DDG is denoted by IO = ∪m
i=1 I(ti ).
Deﬁnition 3.1.3 (Shared object) An object, say o ∈ D, is deﬁned as a shared object
if o is read or written by two or more transactions. The set of shared objects in a
transaction, say t, is denoted by S(t).
for example, the sets of shared objects in Figure 3.1 are S(t1 ) = {o2 , o4 }, S(t2 ) =
{o2 }, S(t3 ) = {o4 , o7 }, and S(t4 ) = {o7 }. The shared objects in Figure 3.1 are shaded
with grey. The set of shared objects in the DDG is denoted by SO = ∪m
i=1 S(ti ).
Notice that, IT ∩ SO = ∅.

3.1.2

The Demarcation Problem

The objective of the demarcation problem is to assign the objects into k nonoverlapping IBs. An IB deﬁnes the extent of the damage caused by the malicious
transaction in the DDG. The advantage of the demarcation is to conﬁne the damage
into a single IB, and thus increases the data availability in the presence of attacks.
However, the overlap among partitions depends on the inter and intra-transaction
dependencies as modeled in the DDG. In particular, for workloads with independent
transactions, the demarcation results in non-overlapping IBs. On the other hand,
for workloads with high inter-transaction dependencies, the demarcation results in
overlapping IBs. As a result, the demarcation into k non-overlapping IBs might be
infeasible. Therefore, we relax this constraint to allow k IBs with minimum overlap.
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Fig. 3.2. Example of IB assignment for two overlapping IBs.

We formulate the demarcation problem as a dual-objective mixed integer nonlinear programming. The first objective function focuses on damage containment
that minimizes the overlap among IBs, while the second objective is to prevent skewed
assignment of transactions to IBs. Formally, we define the demarcation problem as
the following.
Definition 3.1.4 (Intrusion Boundary Demarcation Problem (IBDP)) Given the DDG,
the IBDP is to partition the DDG into k IBs such that the overlap among the IBs is
minimized and the sizes of the IBs are almost equal.
In order to model the first objective function, we define the set of Boundary
Objects (BOs) as follows.
Definition 3.1.5 (Boundary object) An object, say o ∈ D, is defined as a boundary
objects if o is assigned to two or more IBs. The set of BOs in the IB assignment is
denoted by BO.
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for example, the set of BOs in Figure 3.2 is BO = {o4 }. Observe that BO ⊆ SO. It
is suﬃcient to minimize the number of BOs in order to minimize the overlap among
IBs. Thus, the objective function can be deﬁned as follows.
f1 (B) =

n
X

bi

(3.1)

i=1

where B is the BOs vector that indicates if an object is boundary, i.e., bi =1 if the
ith object is a BO, and 0, otherwise (notice that |B| = n). The intuition behind
minimizing the number of BOs is to limit the damage propagation across IBs. However, Equation 3.1 is oblivious to the number of IBs that share a BO. This number
is termed as the degree of sharing. A BO with a degree of sharing of two IBs has less
risk of damage propagation as compared to a BO that is shared among three or more
IBs. The degree of sharing is incorporated in Equation 3.1 in the following way.
!
n
k
X
X
bi
OIB ij − 1
(3.2)
f1 (B, OIB ) =
i=1

j=1

where OIB is the IB assignment matrix for the objects, i.e., OIB ij = 1 if the ith object
P
is assigned to the j th IB, and 0, otherwise. The sum kj=1 OIB ij is the number of IBs
P
to which the ith object is assigned, whereas the sum ni=1 OIB ij is the size of the j th
IB.
The goal of the second objective function is to prevent skewed IBs while assigning
the objects. Formally, the objective of balancing the sizes of IBs is deﬁned as follows.
v
!2
u k k
n
n
uX X X
X
f2 (OIB ) = t
OIB `i −
OIB `j
(3.3)
i=1 j>i

`=1

`=1

Let TrIB be the IB assignment matrix for the transactions, i.e., TrIB ij = 1 if the ith
transaction is assigned to the j th IB, and 0, otherwise. Similarly, let OTr be a binary
matrix representing the association of objects to the transactions, i.e., OTr ij = 1 if
the ith objects is read or written by the j th transaction, and 0, otherwise. Although a
transaction might span multiple IBs, each transaction must be fully contained within
a single IB. The intuition is that by containing a transaction within an IB, the damage
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is conﬁned in that IB if the transaction is detected as malicious. Accordingly, the
IBDP is formulated as a dual-objective optimization problem with objective functions
f1 and f2 as follows.

Minimize

OIB ,TrIB ,B

f1 (B, OIB ) + f2 (OIB )

subject to
k
X

OIB ij − 1 ≤ kbi ,

∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}

(3.4)

j=1

2−

k
X

OIB ij ≤ k(1 − bi ),

j=1

∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
n
X

OTr i` −

i=1

n
X

(3.5)

OTr i` ∗ OIB ij ≥

i=1

1 − TrIB `j

(3.6)

∀` ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
k
X

TrIB ij = 1

∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m}

(3.7)

OIB ij ≥ 1

∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}

(3.8)

j=1
n
X
i=1

OIBij ∈ {0, 1}, T rIBij ∈ {0, 1},
bi ∈ {0, 1}

(3.9)

The outputs of the optimization problem are the IB assignment matrix of the
objects OIB , the IBs assignment matrix of the transactions TrIB , and B the set
of BOs. Constraints (3.4) and (3.5) collectively check if an object is assigned to
multiple IBs. Accordingly, the constraints set bi = 1 if the ith object is boundary,
and 0, otherwise. Full containment of a transaction within a single IB is checked by
constraints (3.6) and (3.7). In particular, a transaction t` is assigned to the j th IB
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only if all the objects read or written by t` are assigned to the j th IB. Constraint
(3.8) impose each IB to contain at least one object, while constraint (3.9) forces OIB ,
TrIB , and B to be binary matrices.
Refer back to Figure 3.2, which illustrates an example of an IB assignment that
results from solving the IBDP with k = 2. Transactions t1 and t2 are assigned to IB1 ,
while transactions t3 and t4 are assigned to IB2 . Notice that t3 spans two IBs because
the t3 has BO o4 that is shared by IB1 and IB2 . The IB assignment table is used
by the response and recovery procedures when the DBMS is encountering malicious
intrusion attacks. The IBs can be implemented using physical or logical partitioning
of the database. Physical partitioning of the database requires placing IBs in diﬀerent
machines, e.g., using cloud computing platforms. However, in this dissertation, IBs
are implemented as logical partitioning using Access Control List (ACL). Fine-grained
ACL that controls access at the object-level is common in commercial and open-source
DBMSs, e.g., Oracle VPD [13], and MS SQL Server [24].
Theorem 3.1.1 The IBDP is NP-hard.
Proof First, we construct the decision formulation of the IBDP as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1.6 (Decisional Intrusion Boundary Demarcation Problem) Given the
DDG created using a set of transactions T over a set of n objects. Does there exist a
k-way IB demarcation such that
n
X
i=1

bi

k
X
j=1

!
OIB ij − 1

v
!2
u k k
n
n
uX
X X
X
+t
OIB `i −
OIB `j
≤ Q?
i=1 j>i

`=1

`=1

We prove that the decisional IBDP is NP-complete by reduction from the Partition
problem.
Deﬁnition 3.1.7 (Partition problem)
INSTANCE: Finite set A of items and a size s(a) ∈ Z + for each a ∈ A.
P
P
QUESTION: Is there a subset A0 ⊆ A such that a∈A0 s(a) = a∈A s(a)?
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We proceed by showing that the decisional IBDP contains the Partition problem
as a special case. Let T = {t1 , t2 , . . . , tm } be the set of transactions in the decisional
IBDP such that ti ∩ tj = ∅ for i 6= j. As a result,
n
X

bi

i=1

k
X

!
OIB ij − 1

=0

(3.10)

j=1

The Partition problem can be reduced to the decisional IBDP in the following way.
Let s(ai ) = |ti |, i.e., the size of the item ai ∈ A equals the the size of transaction
ti ∈ T . Furthermore, let k = 2 and Q = 0. The reduction can be done in polynomial
time. We claim that there is a solution to the decisional IBDP with two IBs that
satisﬁes
n
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if and only if there is a solution to the Partition problem.
Suppose there exists a solution to the decisional IBDP with two IBs for T satisfying
Eq. 3.11. Then, the solution is also a solution for the Partition problem because
!
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X
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Thus,
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We can see that
X
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Thus, the solution of decisional IBDP is also a valid solution for the Partition problem.
In the other direction, suppose there exists a solution to the Partition problem for
A. Then, the size of each subset is equal to each other. We now need to prove that
the solution is also a valid solution to the decisional IBDP that satisﬁes Equation
3.11. Recall that ti ∩ tj = ∅∀i 6= j. Thus,
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Thus, Equation 3.11 is satisﬁed and the solutions of the Partition problem is also a
valid solution to the decisional IBDP.
Finally, a given solution to the decisional IBDP can be veriﬁed in polynomial time.
The IB assignment is checked to see if the objective function is satisﬁed.
Example 3.1.1 Refer to Figure 3.3. Let T = {t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 } be the set of transactions
and A = {4, 2, 4, 2} be the corresponding set of items sizes such that s(ai ) = |ti |.
A valid solution for the Partition problem is A = {4, 2} and A0 = {4, 2}. The
corresponding two-way IB partition is IB1 = {t1 , t2 } and IB2 = {t3 , t4 }, where
P
 P �

P11
P4
2
2
b
x
−
1
+ j=1
C − i=1
yij |ti | = 0.
i
ij
i=1
j=1
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Fig. 3.3. Example of IB assignment with two non-overlapping IBs.

3.2

Heuristics for the Demarcation Problem
We introduce two efficient greedy-based heuristics to solve the IBDP in polynomial

time. Both algorithms take the DDG and the number of IBs as input. The output is
a transaction-to-IB assignment. The algorithms start with an empty IB assignment
and iteratively assign transactions to IBs based on greedy decisions that optimize the
objective functions. The first heuristic is Best-Fit Assignment (BFA) that aims at
reducing the number of BOs produced by the IB assignment. The intuition of the
assignment is that BFA assigns a transaction to the IB that shares the largest number
of shared objects with that transaction. Thus, the number of BOs are reduced. The
second heuristic is Balanced Assignment (BA) that aims at assigning transactions
such that the sizes of all IBs are almost equal. This is achieved by assigning, at each
iteration, the transaction to the IB that is the smallest in size. Detailed discussion
about each algorithm is presented in the following sections.
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3.2.1

Best-Fit Assignment

BFA is listed in Algorithm 1. The algorithm starts with an empty IB assignment
set S and empty assigned transactions set A (Line 1). Then, the transactions are
sorted based on the number of shared objects in ascending order (Line 2). The sorted
transaction set is stored in Set T . Then, the algorithm initially assigns the ﬁrst k
transactions to the empty IBs (Lines 3-9). As a result, the overlap among the IBs is
minimized. This is correct because the ﬁrst k transactions in T have the least number
of shared objects. For the remaining transactions in T , each transaction t is assigned
to the IB that shares the largest number of shared objects with t (Lines 10-19). In
particular, the set of assigned transactions that overlap with t is stored in N T (Line
11). Then, the IBs of each transaction in N T is stored in N IB (Line 12). N IB
contains the set of all IBs that share objects with t. If the set N IB is not empty, t is
assigned to the IB that has the largest number of shared objects with t (Line 14-16).
Otherwise, t is assigned to the smallest IB in S (Line 18).
Lemma 3.2.1 The complexity of BFA is O(nm2 + knm).
Proof BFA sorts the set of transactions based on the number of internal objects
in each transaction (Line 3). Sorting set T has a runtime complexity of O(m log m).
The loop in Lines 3-9 assigns a single transaction to each empty IB. Thus, the loop
has a runtime complexity of O(k). Then, BFA assigns transactions to the best-ﬁt IB
(Lines 10-19). The runtime complexity of ﬁnding the set N T and N IB is O(nm)
(Lines 11 and 12). Finding ibmax , the IB that has the largest number of objects
shared with t, and assigning t in Lines 13-18 has a runtime complexity of O(nk). The
runtime complexity for assigning all the transactions is O(m(nm + nk)). The overall
complexity of BFA is O(m log m+k +nm2 +knm), i.e., approximately O(nm2 +km).
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3.2.2

Balanced Assignment

BA is listed in Algorithm 2. The algorithm starts with an empty assignment set
S (Line 1). Similar to BFA, the transactions are sorted and stored in the set T (Line
2). Then, the algorithm iterates over each transaction t in T (Line 3-14), where, at
each iteration, IBmin that has the smallest number of internal objects is found (Lines
6-12). Then, Transaction t is assigned to IBmin (Line 13). Finally, the IB assignment
is stored in S (Lines 15-17).
Lemma 3.2.2 The complexity of BFA is O(knm).
Proof BFA sorts the set of transactions based on the number of internal objects in
each transaction (Line 2). This step has a runtime complexity of O(m log m). The
inner loop in Lines 6-12 assigns a transaction to the IB with minimum number of
internal objects. The assignment of a single transaction has a complexity of O(nk),
while the assignment of all transaction has a complexity of O(kmn). Thus, the overall
runtime complexity of BA is O(m log m + kmn) that is approximately O(kmn).

3.3

Intrusion Management Architecture

3.3.1

The Architecture

In this section, we introduce the architecture of PIMS, which is depicted in Figure
3.4. PIMS is composed of three components: the Admission Controller (AC), the Response Subsystem (RESS), and the Recovery Subsystem (RECS). In addition, PIMS
maintains a transactions log that stores information about the read/write operations
of transactions and a Corrupted Objects Table (COT) to track the status of the damaged objects caused by the malicious transactions. The transactions log is essential
for the recovery procedure to create and execute the compensating transactions. The
IBDP solver generates the IB assignment using the algorithms discussed in the previous section. The functionality of the AC includes parsing the transactions, regulating
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ALGORITHM 1: Best Fit Assignment
Input: DDG, k
Output: S = {ib1 , ..., ibk }
1.

S = ∅, A = ∅

2.

T ←Sort transactions based on the number of shared objects in ascending order

3.

for i = 1..k do

4.

t ← largest transaction in T

5.

ibi = {t}

6.

S = S ∪ {ibi }

7.

Add t to A

8.

Remove t from T

9.
10.

end
for t ∈ T do

11.

Find N T the set of assigned transactions that overlap with t

12.

Find N IB the set of IBs that overlap with t

13.

if N IB 6= ∅ then

14.

Find ibmax ∈ N IB that has the largest number of objects shared with t

15.

ibmax = ibmax ∪ t

16.

else
Assign t to the smallest ib

17.
18.

end

19.

end

20.

return S

the admission of the transactions to DBMS, and maintaining the IB assignment table.
The AC determines whether to block or allow the incoming transactions depending
on the status of the damage and the assigned IB. When a committed transaction is
identiﬁed as malicious, the RESS extracts the commit time and detection time of the
malicious transaction, approximates the set of corrupted objects immediately, and
stores it in COT. Although the approximated set can include uncorrupted objects,
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ALGORITHM 2: Balanced Assignment
Input: DDG, k
Output: S = {ib1 , ..., ibk }
1.

S=∅

2.

T ←Sort transactions based on the number of internal objects in descending order

3.

for t ∈ T do

4.

ibmin = null

5.

min size = ∞

6.

for i=1...k do

7.

sizei ← Compute the number of internal objects in ibi

8.

if sizei < min size then
min size = sizei

9.

ibmin = ibi

10.

end

11.
12.

end

13.

ibmin = ibmin ∪ t

14.

end

15.

for i=1..k do

16.

S = S ∪ {ibi }

17.

end

18.

return S

the objective is to reduce the risk of damage propagation by executing benign transactions. Then, the RECS analyzes the transactions dependency in the transactions
log and identiﬁes the correct and complete set of aﬀected transactions. The correct
set of aﬀected transactions means that no transactions are falsely identiﬁed as affected, while the complete set means that the set contains every aﬀected transactions
caused by the intrusion attack. We refer to this set as the set of Aﬀected Transactions (AT). When AT is identiﬁed, the uncorrupted objects, which were incorrectly
included in COT, are removed from COT, and consequently can be read or written by
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Fig. 3.4. PIMS Architecture.

the requesting transactions immediately. On the other hand, the corrupted objects
are blocked and will be recovered by the compensating transactions. The recovered
objects are removed from COT gradually in order to increase the system availability.
In the following sections, we present detailed information about the functionality of
each component.

Transactions Log and Corrupted Objects Table
In order to obtain accurate information about the extent of the damage caused by
the malicious transactions, the read/write operations of all transactions need to be
logged. However, conventional undo/redo logs and DBMS triggers only record write
operations. To address this issue, we maintain a table that maintains the transaction
ID, the object ID, the before-image (the previous value), the after-image (the current
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value), and the time-stamp for each read and update operation. PIMS intercepts
the incoming transactions, extracts the required information, and records it in the
transactions log. The transactions log can be also maintained in PostgreSQL for
eﬃcient retrieval by PIMS. The transactions log is used by the AC to check if a
transaction reads from corrupted objects and by the RESS to identify AT.
On the other hand, COT maintains the set of corrupted objects caused by executing the malicious and aﬀected transactions. In particular, COT records the object
ID, the updating transaction ID, detection timestamp, and recovery timestamp. COT
functions as a locking mechanism that prevents incoming transactions from acquiring access to corrupted objects. In essence, COT is used by the AC components in
order to block transactions from reading any corrupted objects. COT is updated by
the RESS and the RECS once the corrupted objects are repaired. When a damaged
object is repaired, the recovery timestamp of the corrupted objects is updated and
consequently any read or write requests by other transactions are guaranteed. COT is
used by the RESS and the RECS and is implemented using a hash table with objects
IDs as keys.

The Admission Controller
The AC has three subcomponents: the Parser, the IB Manager (IBM), and the
Transaction Mediator. The parser extracts the read/write set from transactions. The
IBM maintains in the IB assignment table information about the IBs including the
set of BOs and the transaction-to-IB assignment. The functionality of the IBM is
to manage the read/ write operations of the BOs. In essence, the updated BOs are
locked by the IBM until the IDS reports the status of the updating transaction. If
the transaction is identiﬁed as malicious, then the locked BOs are added to COT.
Otherwise, the locked BOs are released. One problem is that the IDS only triggers
an alarm when a malicious transaction is detected. To overcome this issue, BOs are
locked for a suﬃcient time after which the updating transaction is assumed to be
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benign. We conﬁgure PIMS to wait for twice the detection delay, i.e., 2 ×Δ ms
before releasing the BOs. The objective of locking the BOs after update is to assure
that the damage does not propagate to other IBs. We refer to the process of locking
the BOs as delayed access mechanism.
The transaction mediator checks if the new transaction’s read/write set contains
any object that exists in COT or BO. If an object in the transactions read set exists in
COT, the transaction is suspended. On the other hand, if an object in the transactions
write set exists in COT, then the transaction is executed, and the objects are removed
from COT and are excluded from subsequent undo and redo operations. The AC is
signaled by the RESS or the RECS on two events: 1) the corrupted objects are
recovered, or 2) the recovery procedure is completed. When the AC is signaled, the
mediator executes the suspended transaction if its read objects are all recovered.
Otherwise, the transaction remains suspended until a new signal is received from the
RESS or the RECS. If the transaction’s read/write set contains an object that exists
in BO, then the transaction is suspended until the objects are released by the IB
manager.
Before executing the transaction, the AC acquires the locks associated with the
transaction’s assigned IB(s). The lock is to ensure that no concurrent recovery procedure is running on those IB(s). The lock is released by the AC when the transaction
is executed successfully. The overall procedure for admission control is listed in Algorithm 3. Notice that multiple instances of the AC can be executed using multiple
threads to increase the transactions concurrency. We rely on the available Concurrency APIs to queue the incoming transactions when the mediator threads are busy
waiting for signals.

The Response Subsystem
The RESS is activated when a transaction tm is detected as malicious by the
IDS. The objective of the RESS is to prevent subsequent benign transactions from
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ALGORITHM 3: Admission control
Input: ti
Output:
1.

RWti ← the read/write objects set ti

2.

while RWti ∩ BO =
6 ∅ do

3.

Wait until the requested BO is released

4.

end

5.

while RWti ∩ COT =
6 ∅ do

6.
7.

Wait until request objects in COT are recovered and released
end
/* Acquire lock, if lock can’t be acquired wait until lock can be acquired
*/

8.

Acquire lock on IBti
/* Lock on IBti is used to guarantee mutual execution with recovery
transactions

9.
10.

*/

Execute ti
Release lock on IBti

reading corrupted objects that are updated by tm , and thus control the spread of
the damage. The RESS collects the time information about tm from the IDS and
the transactions log, i.e., the commit timestamp tcm and the detection timestamp tdm .
Moreover, the RESS extracts IBtm , the set of IBs that are spanned by tm , from the
IB assignment table. Consequently, the RESS adds all objects in IBtm that have
been updated between tcm and tdm to COT. Notice that the objects that are updated
between tcm and tdm but not assigned to IBtm are not added to COT. Thus, PIMS
provides more accurate damage conﬁnement as compared to ITDB, which blocks all
objects on temporal basis only. Nevertheless, COT might still contain uncorrupted
objects that are updated by benign transactions. Once enough information about the
inter-transaction dependencies between tm and subsequent transactions is gathered,
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ALGORITHM 4: Intrusion Response
Input: tm , tdm
Output: Updated COT
1.

tcm ← get commit time of tm

2.

Find IBtm the set of IBs spanned by tm

3.

for objects updated between tcm and tdm do

4.

if object is assigned to an IB ∈ IBtm then
Add object to COT

5.
6.
7.

end
end

PIMS removes the uncorrupted objects from COT as explained in the next section.
The procedure of the RESS is summarized in Algorithm 4.

The Recovery Subsystem
The RECS is the core component of PIMS that identiﬁes AT and executes the
compensating transactions for the corrupted objects. The compensating transactions
perform two operations: undo and redo. The undo operation unwinds the eﬀect of the
malicious transactions and all transactions in AT. By performing the undo operation,
the state of the DBMS returns to the state just before the malicious transaction is
executed. However, the update operations performed by the subsequent benign transactions are lost. The redo operation preserves the lost updates by re-executing each
transaction in AT. Notice that the malicious transaction is not re-executed because
its updates are undesirable.
The overall algorithm of the RECS is listed in Algorithm 5. The RECS is activated
once the response procedure is ﬁnished. Thus, the response and recovery transactions
are executed serially. Serializing the response and recovery procedures is essential to
avoid conﬂicts on COT, which is also updated by the RESS. The RECS temporarily
blocks new transactions to prevent them from reading the corrupted objects while
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ALGORITHM 5: Intrusion Recovery
Input: tm , IBtm
Output: Updated COT
1.

Acquire recovery lock in every IB ∈ IBtm

2.

Block new transactions in IBtm

3.

Wait for currently running transaction in IBtm to commit

4.

Find the set of aﬀected transaction ATtm

5.

Find the S set of all updated objects by tm and ta ∈ AT

6.

Resume new transaction in IBtm

7.

for o ∈ COT do

8.

if o ∈
/ S then
Remove o from COT and ﬂag as valid

9.
10.

end

11.

end

12.

Resume transactions to IBtm
/* Phase I

13.

Undo tm

14.

for Ta ∈ ATtm do

15.
16.

Undo Ta
end
/* Phase II

17.
18.
19.

*/

*/

for Ta ∈ ATtm do
Redo Ta
end

the RECS identiﬁes AT. This is achieved by acquiring locks on IBtm , which are also
used by the AC to block incoming transactions.
There might be running transactions at the time the recovery procedure starts. In
order to deal with those running transaction, there are two approaches: preemptive
and non-preemptive approach. A preemptive approach requires that all active run-
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ning transactions are stopped until the recovery procedure is ﬁnished. The interrupted
transactions are stored in a queue to be executed in-order once the recovery procedure
is ﬁnished. The advantage of the preemptive approach is to stop the damage immediately. However, the disadvantage is that the transactions that are independent from
the malicious transaction have to be blocked. On the other hand, a non-preemptive
approach does not stop running transactions. As a result, the damage can spread
if the transactions are reading or writing corrupted objects. The advantage of the
non-preemptive approach is that independent transactions are not interrupted and
thus a high system availability is maintained. We adopt the preemptive approach for
the rest of the dissertation. A tradeoﬀ comparison between the two approaches is
provided in Section 3.4.3
The Dependency Analyzer scans the transactions log starting from tcm through
the current timestamp in order to ﬁnd AT. The write set of each transaction in AT
is extracted and is added to COT. The Damage Assessment subsystem removes the
uncorrupted objects that have been initially added by the RESS from COT. At this
point, COT contains the correct and complete set of corrupted objects caused by tm .
The Compensation Manager (CM) executes a sequence of compensating transactions
that gradually repair the damage. The Damage repair is performed in the following
two phases:
• Phase I (Undo Operation): The CM executes the compensating transactions
to unwind the eﬀect of the malicious and aﬀected transactions. The CM uses
the transactions log to ﬁnd the correct version of the corrupted objects. In
particular, the CM updates the corrupted objects with the values of the most
recent versions before the execution of the malicious transaction. The compensating transactions are executed in the order at which the malicious and aﬀected
transactions are committed. At the end of this phase, the Damage Cleansing
(DC) removes the recovered objects from COT and signals the AC to resume
any blocked transactions.
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• Phase II (Redo Operation): In order to recover the lost eﬀects of AT, the CM
runs the compensating transactions that re-execute each transaction in AT in
the same order at which they are committed. The information required to reexecute the transactions, e.g., old balance, is maintained in the transactions
log. Once an aﬀected transaction is re-executed successfully, the DC removes
the set of recovered objects from COT and signals the AC.

3.3.2

Managing Multiple Malicious Transactions

The advantage of partitioning the objects into IBs is to execute concurrent response and recovery procedures on diﬀerent IBs. The reason is that all transactions
in AT are guaranteed to be contained in IBtm . As a result, concurrent recovery procedures do not perform conﬂicting operations while recovering the corrupted objects.
Multiple instances of response and recovery procedures are executed using multiple
threads. In the case when multiple malicious transactions are detected within the
same IB, the recovery procedures need to be coordinated to avoid out-of-order execution of the recovery operations. The strategy is to execute the recovery procedures
for the malicious transactions in the same order in which they are detected.

3.3.3

Correctness of the Transaction Recovery

In this section, we discuss the correctness of the recovery procedure for PIMS. The
overall response and recovery procedures are illustrated in Figure 3.5. In the ﬁgure,
the vertical black lines along the timeline depict the events at which PIMS performs
either response or recovery tasks. The red crosses depict potential arrival events of
new transactions. Tables 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) show the corresponding list of the tasks
and arrival events, respectively.
The essence of the correctness of the recovery procedure is the correct identiﬁcation of AT. Therefore, it is suﬃcient to prove that PIMS correctly identiﬁes AT
to prove the correctness of the recovery procedure. The challenge associated with
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Fig. 3.5. Illustration of PIMS procedures.

identifying AT arises from the concurrent execution of transactions and recovery
procedures. If no transactions are running during the recovery procedure, then the
problem of identifying AT is trivial by extracting the transactions dependencies from
the transactions log. The strategy of PIMS is to block the incoming transactions
momentarily until the set of aﬀected transactions is identiﬁed. The blocking window
during which the transactions are blocked is given in Figure 3.5 between τc and τe .
In the preemptive approach, all transaction are stopped at τc and thus AT can be
identiﬁed correctly. On the other hand, in the non-preemptive approach, PIMS waits
for all active transactions to commit eventually. This event is depicted as τd . In either case, no transactions are running during τd and τe and thus PIMS can correctly
identify AT.
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3.4

Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the proposed PIMS

framework. First, we discuss the synthetic workload used for the performance evaluation. Then, we evaluate the performance of the proposed IB demarcation heuristics.
Finally, we conduct extensive system evaluation of PIMS using synthesized workloads,
and present the evaluation results.

3.4.1

Malicious Transactions Benchmark

Several benchmarks have been developed to evaluate the performance of Online Transaction Processing (OLTP) systems, e.g., TPC-C [62], SmallBank [63], and
YCSB [64]. However, no benchmark has been developed to evaluate the performance of intrusion management systems in OLTP. To address this challenge, we have
developed a malicious transaction benchmark (MTB) that generates long chains of
dependent transactions, which amplify the potential damage that can be caused by
the malicious transactions. In essence, executing dependent transactions shortly after
malicious transactions induce severe damage spread. Thus, MTB allows to assess the
capability of the intrusion management systems in terms of conﬁning and recovering
the damage without degrading the performance of the DBMS.
The proposed MTB simulates a banking money-transfer application. In essence,
MTB consists of a single data table, Checking, that has two attributes: account id
and balance. MTB has three types of money-transfer operations: distribute, collect,
and many-to-many transfer. A distribute operation transfers money from a single
account to N other accounts; A collect operation transfers money from M accounts
to a single account; A many-to-many operations transfers money from N accounts to
another M accounts. A pictorial representation of the transfer transactions is given
in Figure 3.6. MTB is implemented on an OLTP-benchmark testbed for relational
databases [65].
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We now explain the process of generating a workload of m transactions in MTB.
We use four parameters to characterize the workload: 1) the inter-transaction dependency probability threshold β, 2) the maximum number of dependent transactions
T xmax , 3) the amount of transferred money γ, and 4) the maximum transaction
size Sizemax . First, the inter-transaction dependency is modeled using PG. PG is
constructed using the Erdös-Renyi model [66], in which an edge has probability p of
existence. The degree of inter-transaction dependency is controlled by grouping transactions into small groups. Within each group, a pair of transactions are dependent
if p is greater than β. Semantically, each group models money transfer transactions
within a city, state, or country. In order to avoid fully connected graphs within the
group of transactions, the number of allowed dependent transactions is limited to
T xmax . In other words, a transaction can be dependent on no more than T xmax
transactions. Once a PG is created, objects are assigned to the transactions as follows. The size of each transactions is determined using a uniform distribution with
a range of [2,Sizemax ]. The transaction type is randomly selected from distribute,
collect, or many-to-many. Each transaction shares a single object with the set of its
dependent transactions. The value of γ is chosen from a uniform distribution with
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range of [0.01,0.1]. Accordingly, the transaction is generated. We generate 4 workloads with diﬀerent sizes, mainly, 5000, 10000, 15000, and 20000 transactions. For
each workload, we vary the value of β to be 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75.

3.4.2

Heuristics Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed heuristics using a synthetic transactional workload. We compare the performance of the proposed heuristics
with two assignment techniques: Random Assignment (RA) and Skewed Assignment
(SA). In RA, transactions are randomly assigned to the IBs. In SA, transactions are
randomly assigned to the IBs following an 80-20 rule, i.e., 80% of the transactions
are assigned to 20% of the IBs. SA is used to emphasize the importance of the size
balancing objective (Equation 3.3). We use two metrics to evaluate the performance
of the heuristics: the total number of BOs (Equation 3.2), and the assignment fairness
index. The fairness index is used to assess the heuristics performance in terms of IBs
size balancing. The fairness index is an adaptation of the Jain’s fairness index [67].
P
( ki=1 |IBi |)2
J (IB1 , IB2 , . . . , IBk ) =
(3.19)
Pk
k · i=1
|IBi |2
where |IBi | is the number of transactions assigned to the ith IB.
In the ﬁrst experiment, we vary the number of IBs, i.e., k, using a workload of 5000
transactions and β = 0.75. Figure 3.7(a) illustrates that the number of BOs increases
as k increases. The reason is that as k increases, the number of contained transactions
in each IB is reduced. As a result, the overlap among IBs increases and thus increases
the total number of BOs. We observe that BFA produces less BOs compared to BA
and RA. The reason is that BFA performs a greedy decision to reduce the number of
BOs when assigning a transaction to an IB. Moreover, BA performs better than RA
because BA attempts to balance the sizes of the IBs. Notice that SA produces less
BOs than BFA for k <10, but more BOs when k>10. The reason is that, when the
number of IBs is small, e.g., for k=5 and k=10, 80% of the transactions are assigned
only to OneIB and two IBs, respectively. Thus, most of the transaction dependencies
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Fig. 3.7. Eﬀect of k on a workload of 5000 transactions with α = 0.75.

are contained in at most two IBs. BFA and BA produce fair assignment as in Figure
3.7(b). SA performs the worst by design, while RA performs better when the number
of transactions is large and the number of IBs is small because the random assignment
tends to be fair.
In the next experiment, we vary the number of transactions and the value of β
while generating the IB assignment with k = 10. We observe that increasing the
number of transactions increases the number of BOs as in Figure 3.8(a). The reason
is that increasing the number of transactions increases the number of shared objects
among transactions. Similarly, increasing the value of β increases the number of BOs
as given in Figure 3.8(b). The reason is that as the value of β increases, the number of
dependent transactions increases. As a result, the number of shared objects increases.

3.4.3

Evaluation Results

The experiments are conducted on a Dell Power Edge R420 server with 6-core
Intel E5-2620v3 CPU, 120 GB of RAM, and Ubuntu Server 16.0 LTS OS. We use
PostgreSQL 9.5 as the host DBMS. PIMS is implemented using Java and is connected
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Fig. 3.8. Eﬀect of the number of transactions and the value of β on a
workload 5000 transactions with α = 0.75.

to PostgreSQL using JDBC. We use 8 workers (threads) for the AC and an unlimited
pool of threads for the response and recovery procedures. Before each experiment, the
Checking table is populated with 100,000 objects of unique account IDs and initial
balance of $10,000. We use a B-tree index on the Checking table to improve the
query execution time. We assume that the transactions are submitted according to
a Poisson distribution with an arrival rate of λ. Furthermore, malicious transactions
are injected into the workload using a uniform distribution over time. The number of
malicious transactions is based on the attack intensity π that is a percentage of the
number of malicious transactions to the total number of transactions.
We evaluate the performance of PIMS using four metrics: 1) the number of affected transactions, 2) the number of blocked transactions, 3) the average recovery
time, and 4) the average response time. The number of blocked transactions quantiﬁes the performance of PIMS in terms of availability, while the number of aﬀected
transactions indicates the cost of damage. The average response time is computed
based on the response times of all committed transactions. We compare the performance of PIMS using the proposed heuristics, i.e., BFA and BA, with RA and SA.
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We refer to PIMS with k>1 as ”PIMS k”. We often use PIMS k BFA, PIMS k BA,
PIMS k RA, and PIMS k SA to diﬀerentiate between the assignment techniques as
needed. The performance of PIMS is compared against PIMS 1 (denoted by OneIB )
and ITDB [68]. We use a workload of 5000 transactions to conduct the experiments,
unless stated otherwise. In each experiment, we run PIMS with k values of 5, 10, 15,
and 20. We do not notice any improvement in the performance beyond 20 IBs.

PIMS Overhead
In this experiment, we study the overhead of PIMS as compared to a ”vanilla”
PostgreSQL with benign workload. Figures 3.9(a) and 3.9(b) give the throughput
and response time for PIMS and vanilla PostgreSQL for various values of λ. Notice
that the throughput in both cases match the transaction arrival rate. However, PIMS
adds 30% overhead to the response time. This overhead is inevitable because PIMS
performs various extra operations including logging read operations, controlling access
to corrupted objets, and blocking access to boundary objects.

500

OneIB
ITDB

PIMS_10_BFA
PIMS_10_BA

400
300
200
100
0

1%

5%

10%

1000
Number of blocked transactions

Number of affected transactions

45

OneIB
ITDB

PIMS_10_BFA
PIMS_10_BA

800
600
400
200
0

15%

1%

5%

10%

π

(a) Aﬀected transactions

Average recovery time (ms)

350

(b) Blocked transactions
OneIB
ITDB

PIMS_10_BFA
PIMS_10_BA

300
250
200
150
100
50
0

1%

5%

10%

15%

π

(c) Average recovery time

40
Average response time (ms)

400

15%

π

35

OneIB
ITDB

PIMS_10_BFA
PIMS_10_BA

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

1%

5%

10%

15%

π

(d) Average response time

Fig. 3.10. Eﬀect of π on a workload of 5000 transactions with k = 10,
Δ = 100 ms, and λ = 10.

Eﬀect of Attack Intensity
In this experiment, we compare the performance of PIMS and OneIB with ITDB
as the attack intensity π increases. We use k = 10 and Δ = 100 ms to plot the
results using BFA and BA assignments. Refer to Figure 3.10. We observe that the
extent of the damage increases as the attack intensity increases. In particular, the
number of aﬀected transactions increases as we increases the number of malicious
transactions 3.10(a). This is intuitive because increasing the number of malicious
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Fig. 3.11. Eﬀect of π on a workload of 5000 transactions with k, Δ = 100
ms, and λ = 10.

transactions increases the number of aﬀected transactions with the same level of intertransaction dependency. However, the average time to recover the damage remains
constant as in Figure 3.10(c). Observe that the number of aﬀected transactions and
the average recovery time for PIMS 10 BFA and PIMS 10 BA are less than OneIB
and ITDB. The reason is that PIMS employs the delayed access mechanism that
takes a proactive approach to block the incoming transactions, which can potentially
spread the damage. However, the disadvantage of the delayed access mechanism
is the increase in the number of blocked transactions and average response time
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as illustrated in Figure 3.10(b) and 3.10(d). PIMS BFA has less response time as
compared to PIMS BA because BFA generates lower number of BOs. Notice that
the delayed access mechanism is not active in the case of OneIB and ITDB because
there are no BOs, and thus the response time is lower than PIMS.
In general, increasing the number of aﬀected transactions increases the number
of compensating transactions to be performed. Consequently, the average recovery
time increases. Similarly, increasing the number of blocked transactions increases the
average response time. Even though OneIB and ITDB almost have the same number
of aﬀected transactions with the same attack intensity, OneIB encounters less recovery time as compared to ITDB. The reason is that ITDB needs multiple passes on
the transactions logs to ﬁnd AT [10], while OneIB needs a single pass because it temporarily blocks incoming transactions. However, the overhead of blocking incoming
transactions is an increase in the number of blocked transactions and response time
in OneIB as compared to ITDB.
We note that PIMS reduces the number of aﬀected transactions by at least 33% as
compared to ITDB. Consequently, the average recovery time is reduced by 50%, i.e.,
150 ms in PIMS 10 BFA as compared to 300 ms in ITDB with 750 malicious transactions. The downside is that PIMS incurs a larger number of blocked transactions
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due to blocking the incoming transactions that request to read BOs. The increase in
the response time in PIMS is around 60% as compared to ITDB. Nevertheless, the
average response time for PIMS does not exceed 50 ms when π =15%.
In the next experiment, we show the performance of PIMS under normal operations, i.e., no malicious transactions (π = 0%). We compare the performance of
BFA using π values of 0%, 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% while changing the value of k
as depicted in Figure 3.11. Note that the number of aﬀected transaction, and thus
the average recovery time, is 0 when π = 0%. The ﬁgure shows that increasing k is
more eﬀective for large values of π. In particular, when k is increased from one to
ﬁve, the number of aﬀected transactions is reduced by 26% in the case of π = 15%
as compared to 5% in the case of π = 1% (Figure 3.11(a)). In addition, the number
of blocked transactions is increased by 95% in the case of 1% as compared to 18%
in the case of 15% (Figure 3.11(b)). Notice that, for a given value of k, increasing
π yields a larger number of blocked transactions and longer average response time
as illustrated in Figures 3.11(b) and 3.11(d). Moreover, as k increases, the increase
in the average response time increases when the attack gets more intense. Figure
3.12 gives the throughput of PIMS and OneIB as the attack intensity increases for
Δ = 100 ms and λ = 10. We note that PIMS and OneIB match the transaction
arrival rate λ, and thus do not incur any overhead on the throughput.

The Eﬀect of The Number of IBs
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of PIMS with various values of
k, i.e., 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20. We compare the results of PIMS BFA and PIMS BA with
oneIB. Moreover, we study the performance of PIMS RA and PIMS SA to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed heuristics. Figure 3.13 gives the performance
of PIMS with Δ = 100 ms, λ = 10, and π = 10%, i.e., 500 malicious transactions.
From Figure 3.13, we observe that increasing k improves the performance of PIMS.
In particular, the number of aﬀected transactions is reduced by at least 5%, 18%,
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Fig. 3.13. Eﬀect of k on a workload of 5000 transactions with Δ = 100
ms, λ = 10, and π = 10%.

26%, and 48% using SA, BFA, BA, and RA, respectively. Consequently, the average
recovery time decreases as k increases. However, PIMS incurs at least 20%, 37%,
50%, and 63% of response time overhead in SA, BFA, BA, and RA, respectively, as
Figure 3.13(d) illustrates. The reason is due to the increase in the number of BOs.
We note that the increase in the response time overhead is marginal as the value of
k increases beyond 10.
Although PIMS BFA has the least reduction in recovery time as compared to
PIMS BA and PIMS RA, PIMS BFA has the minimum response time overhead. We
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Fig. 3.14. Eﬀect of the delayed access mechanism on a workload of 5000
transactions with Δ = 100 ms, λ = 10, and π = 10%.

note that PIMS SA has less response time than PIMS BFA when k < 10 because
the number of BOs generated by SA is less than BFA as explained in Section 3.4.2.
However, the response time of PIMS SA increases dramatically for k>10 as the assignment skewness is obvious. On the other hand, PIMS RA outperforms PIMS BFA
and PIMS BA in terms of reducing the number of aﬀected transactions, and thus
the recovery time. However, PIMS RA incurs the highest overhead in response time.
From these experiments, we conclude that PIMS BFA and PIMS BA produce a bal-
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anced performance in terms of recovery and response time as compared to PIMS RA
and PIMS SA over a wide range of k values.
In the next experiment, we study the eﬀect of the delayed access mechanism on
the performance of PIMS. We compare the performance of PIMS BFA, PIMS BA,
PIMS RA, and PIMS SA with delay and without delay. From Figure 3.14(a), we
observe that the number of aﬀected transactions is larger when the delayed access
mechanism is oﬀ. The reason is that the damage propagates across the IBs. However,
the shortcoming of the delayed access mechanism is the increase in the response time
overhead as demonstrated in Figure 3.14(d). The reason is the increase in the number
of blocked transactions due to blocking BOs. The overhead is more noticeable in
the case of PIMS RA as compared to PIMS BFA. In conclusion, the delayed access
mechanism allows to contain the damage and reduce the recovery time in the case of
PIMS BFA and PIMS BA. Moreover, PIMS with delayed access mechanism maintains
a reasonable response time overhead, and thus improves the overall availability.

Sensitivity Analysis
The next set of experiments aims at studying the eﬀect of various workload and
system parameters, i.e., the transaction arrival rate λ, the detection delay Δ, the
number of transactions, the table size, and the probability of the inter-transaction
dependency β. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the parameters used for the experiments in this section.
Figure 3.15 gives the performance of PIMS 10 BFA, PIMS 10 BA, PIMS 10 RA
and OneIB when varying the value of λ. The IDS detection delay is ﬁxed at Δ = 100
ms, while the attack intensity is set to 10%. For PIMS 10, the number of aﬀected
transactions and recovery time increase as λ increases. The reason is that as λ increases, more transactions arrive before the detection of the malicious transactions,
and thus read the corrupted objects. The number of blocked transactions also increases as λ increases because it takes a longer time to recover the damage caused
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Table 3.1.
Summary of the parameters used in the sensitivity analysis.
Parameter

Description

λ

Transaction arrival rate

Δ

Intrusion detection delay

m

Number of transactions

n

Number of objects (table size)

β

Probability of inter-transactions dependency

by the malicious transaction. Consequently, the response time increases as λ increases. Notice that OneIB has a larger number of aﬀected transactions as compared
to PIMS 10 when λ < 30. However, when λ = 40, OneIB has less aﬀected transactions than BFA and BA. This is because that for the same Δ, increasing λ increases
the number of the transactions arriving when the blocking window of the recovery
mechanism is active. Thus, the rapidly arriving transactions are blocked. Notice
that this phenomena is not noticeable in PIMS 10 because the recovery mechanism
is IB-centric, i.e., recovery procedures for diﬀerent IBs are executed in parallel.
The number of aﬀected transactions in PIMS RA is constant as λ increases. The
reason is that the transactions requesting to read a BO must wait for at least Δ ms
before the BOs are released. Moreover, the number of aﬀected transactions in OneIB
is larger than that of PIMS 10 becuase there are no BOs in OneIB case. Figure 3.16
gives the throughput of PIMS and OneIB as λ increases. We note that PIMS starts
to incur an overhead on the throughput at λ = 40. The performance degradation is
noticeable for PIMS BFA and PIMS BA. This is due to the increase in the response
time as Figure 3.15(d) illustrates. For the rest of the experiments, we only show the
results of the average recovery and response time.
Figure 3.17 gives the performance of PIMS 10 and OneIB as the value of Δ increases, i.e., Δ = 10, 50, 100, 500, and 1000 ms. The transaction arrival rate is ﬁxed

53
1800
PIMS_10_BFA
PIMS_10_BA
PIMS_10_RA
OneIB

400
300
200
100
0

10

20

30

Number of all blocked transactions

Number of affected transactions

500

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
PIMS_10_BFA
PIMS_10_BA
PIMS_10_RA
OneIB

400
200
0

40

10

20

30

λ

(a) Aﬀected transactions

(b) Blocked transactions

PIMS_10_BFA
PIMS_10_BA
PIMS_10_RA
OneIB

250
200
150
100
50
0

10

20

30
λ

(c) Average recovery time

40

140
Average response time (ms)

Average recovery time (ms)

300

40

λ

PIMS_10_BFA
PIMS_10_BA
PIMS_10_RA
OneIB

120
100
80
60
40
20
0

10

20

30

40

λ

(d) Average response time

Fig. 3.15. Eﬀect of λ on a workload of 5000 transactions with Δ = 100,
and π =10% malicious intensity.

at λ = 10. The average recovery time increases as the value of Δ increases (Figure
5.8(d)). Observe that the average recovery time in OneIB is larger than in the case
of PIMS 10 because there are no BOs in OneIB. Figure 5.8(d) illustrates that the
response time increases as Δ increases. This is because of the delayed access mechanism. PIMS 10 incurs an increase of about 840% as compared to the OneIB case
when Δ = 1000 ms, while the recovery time is reduced by about 20% for PIMS 10
as compared to OneIB. Thus, OneIB is better for the IDS with poor detection delay,
i.e., when Δ > 100 ms.
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Fig. 3.17. Eﬀect of Δ on a workload of 5000 transactions wtih λ = 10 and
π = 10%.

In the next experiment, we study the eﬀect of table size on the performance of
PIMS 10 and OneIB. Figure 3.18 gives the response and recovery time for table sizes
of 100K, 500K, 1M, and 5M. We observe that increasing the table size increases both
the recovery and response time. A plausible argument for the increase in response time
is due to the increase in the access time on the data table exhibited by PostgreSQL.
Notice that PIMS executes the compensating transactions that updates the data
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Fig. 3.18. Eﬀect of the number of objects (table size) on a workload of
5000 transactions with Δ = 100 ms, λ = 10, and π = 10%.

table with the correct values. Thus, the recovery time also increases as the table size
increases.
In the next experiment, we vary the probability of inter-transaction dependency,
i.e., β = 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75. Figure 3.19 demonstrates that increasing the value of
β increases the recovery time. The reason is that in the case of inter-transaction
dependency, i.e., when β = 0.75, the number of aﬀected transactions is larger than
the case of low inter-transaction dependency, i.e., β = 0.25. As a result, the recovery
takes longer time in the former case. Moreover, the increase in the recovery time leads
to an increase in the response time because, on average, the blocked transactions need
to wait longer to read the recovered objects.
In the last experiment, we vary the number of transactions while ﬁxing the intensity of attack at π = 10%. We ﬁx the table size to be 500K. From Figure 3.20, we
observe that the average recovery time is almost constant as the number of transactions increases. On the other hand, the average response time slightly increases as
the number of transactions increases due to the increase in the number of accessed
objects.
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Fig. 3.19. Eﬀect of β on a workload of 5000 transactions with Δ = 100,
λ = 10, and π = 10%.
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Fig. 3.20. Eﬀect of the number of transactions with Δ = 100, λ = 10, and
π = 10%.

Preemptive Vs. Non-preemptive Approach
In this experiment, we compare the performance of the preemptive and nonpreemptive approaches that are described in Section 3.3. We denote the preemptive
approach by immediate since the transactions are immediately blocked from read
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or writing the damaged tuples; The non-preemptive is denoted by delayed. Figure
3.21(a) illustrates that immediate blocking of the transactions yields less number of
aﬀected transaction. However, it incurs more blocked transactions and thus longer
average response time as illustrated in Figures 3.21(b) and 3.21(d). In conclusion, the
preemptive approach is suitable when the cost of compensating the aﬀected transactions is high, e.g., ﬁnancial transactions. On the other hand, the non-preemptive
approach is preferred for delay-sensitive applications as it attains a lower average
response time as compared to the preemptive approach.
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Fig. 3.21. A tradeoﬀ comparison between preemptive approach (immediate) and non-preemptive approach (delayed) with k = 10, Δ = 100 ms,
and λ = 10.
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3.5

Implementation of PIMS Using Advisory Locks
In Section 3.3.1, we have discussed the implementation of PIMS using COT as

a hash table. Recall that the objective of COT is to maintain the set of corrupted
objects and prevent incoming transactions from acquiring access to the set. When
COT is not empty, the read/write set of the incoming transaction is checked against
COT; The transaction is blocked if its read/write set contains at least one object that
is also contained in COT. The disadvantage of this approach is the cost of checking
the read/write set of all incoming transactions, whether malicious or benign. In this
section, we discuss an alternative implementation of PIMS using application-enforced
database locks in PostgreSQL, called Advisory Locks. There are two ways to acquire
an advisory lock in PostgreSQL: at session-level or at transaction-level. When the
advisory lock is acquired at the session-level, it is not bound to any transactions
and thus is held until explicitly released or the session ends. On the other hand,
transaction-level advisory locks are similar to regular lock requests. In particular, the
locks are automatically released when the transaction ends. The beneﬁt of using advisory locks is the ability to implement application-level concurrency control patterns
without the need to modify the PostgreSQL engine.
The overall procedure of the AC with advisory locks is listed in Algorithm 6.
The procedure is similar to the procedure of the AC listed in Algorithm 3. The
diﬀerence is in acquiring the advisory locks for all read/write objects before executing
the transactions (Lines 5-7). An advisory lock is acquired on an object by executing
”SELECT pg advisory lock(OID)”, where OID is the PostgreSQL’s object ID. Once
the advisory lock on an object is acquired by the transaction, the object is locked
and no other transactions can read or write into that object, i.e., the advisory lock
functions like an exclusive lock. The AC unlocks the object after the transaction is
committed successfully by executing ”SELECT pg advisory unlock(OID)”. Notice
that the AC executes an unlock function for every locked object to avoid potential
deadlocks among transactions.
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ALGORITHM 6: Implementation of Admission Control using PostgreSQL advisory locks
Input: tm , IBtm
Output:
1.

RWti ← the read/write objects set ti

2.

while RWti ∩ BO =
6 ∅ do
Wait until the requested BO is released

3.
4.

end

5.

for o ∈ RWti do
SELECT pg advisory lock(o.OID)

6.

/* Otherwise, wait until advisory lock is acquired
7.

end

8.

Acquire lock on IBti

9.

Execute ti

10.

Release lock on IBti

11.

for o ∈ RWti do
SELECT pg advisory unlock(o.OID)

12.
13.

*/

end

Figure 3.22 illustrates the procedure of the AC using advisory locks when executing
the transactions in history H1 (Figure 5.4). In the ﬁgure, the AC locks objects
o1 , o2 , o3 , and o4 before executing transaction t1 . When attempting to execute t2 , the
AC attempts to lock objects o2 and o5 . However, because object o2 is already locked,
t2 is blocked and stored in a queue maintained by PostgreSQL. t2 is resumed when
the AC releases the locks on object o2 .

3.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, the problem of response and recovery of successful intrusion at-

tacks on a DBMS is addressed. We propose PIMS, a data partitioning-based intrusion
management system for DBMSs, that can endure intense malicious intrusion attacks.
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Fig. 3.22. Illustration of executing transactions in H1 using PIMS with
PostgreSQL advisory locks.

A new ﬁne-grained dependency model that captures the intra-transaction and intertransaction dependencies is introduced. Using the proposed dependency model, we
introduce a data partitioning scheme, termed intrusion boundaries, with the objective
to limit the extent of the damage into partitions. We formulate the IB demarcation
problem as a dual-objective optimization problem, prove that the problem is NPhard, and propose eﬃcient heuristic solutions. We present the architecture of PIMS
and conduct various experiments to evaluate its performance. We show that although
PIMS incurs response time overhead, the reduction in the number of aﬀected transactions and the recovery time is up to 48% and 52%, respectively.
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4. INTRUSION MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE FOR
ACCESS-CONTROLLED SKEWED WORKLOAD
In this chapter, we introduce the integrated access control and hotspot model for
IB demarcation. Then, we extend the architecture of PIMS to include the hotpot
synchronization module. Finally, we present the performance evaluation for the integrated architecture.

4.1

Hotspot and Access Control Model
In Chapter 3, we have modeled the IB demarcation problem as a cost-driven

optimization problem in which the transactions are assigned to IBs. One limitation
of this formulation is the high computational cost of the assignment as the number
of transactions increases. To address this issue, we have incorporated access control
policy, e.g., RBAC, in the IB demarcation problem such that the transactions are
grouped into roles based on the privilege set assigned to users who are executing
the transactions. We assume that the access control policy supports ﬁne-grained
enforcement of authorization rules on data objects. Fine-grained authorization is
supported in most of the commercial oﬀ-the-shelf database, e.g., VPD in Oracle
[13] and RLS in Postgres. Roles are then assigned to IBs according to the solution
generated by the IB demarcation cost functions. Accordingly, the control of an IB
can be speciﬁed using ACLs that are associated with the roles. RBAC policy also
provides an additional advantage for the IDS to detect anomalous queries by analyzing
the access control proﬁle of the users [9, 69].
In many applications, the rate at which the transactions access certain objects
is often skewed. In other words, the transaction workload imposes more access on
a group of objects, termed Hotspots, as compared to the rest of the objects. For
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example, 40-60% of the volume on the New York Stock Exchange occurs on just 40
out of 4000 stocks [70]. Another example is social networks, such as Twitter, where
celebrities have millions of followers that require several dedicated servers just to
process their updates. In this dissertation, we assume that the set of hotpot objects in
the workload is known. There are various ways to obtain information about hotspots,
such as statistical modeling using Zipﬁan distribution [64].
The IB demarcation based on RBAC roles is governed by the distribution of
hotspot objects among roles. Once the hotspot objects are identiﬁed by the hotspot
identiﬁcation module, the association matrix between hotspot objects, transactions,
and roles are generated. Formally, let H be the set of hotspot objects, R be the set of
roles, and HT be the association relation between hotspot objects and transactions.
We consider a one-to-one mapping between transactions and roles, i.e., only one role
can execute any given transaction. The mapping of transaction into roles is modeled
by the association relation V . By combining HT and V , let Z be the mapping
between hotspot and roles. The matrix Z is used in the IB demarcation problem as
explained in the next section.

4.1.1

Access Control and Hotspot Demarcation Problem

The objective of the Access Control and Hotspot Demarcation Problem (ACHDP)
is to assign the skewed access-controlled data objects into k IBs with minimum overlap. We formulate the problem of ﬁnding the set of overlapping IBs as a dual-objective
optimization problem. We deﬁne the ﬁrst objective function as to balance the number of hotspots among IBs with the goal to achieve high availability. The intuition is
as the following. Assume that the hotspot objects are fairly distributed among IBs
and if an IB is attacked by a malicious transaction, then hotspots in other IBs are
protected. Formally, we can express this metrics-driven objective of balancing the
hotspot objects among k IBs function f1 as the following.
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f1 =

k X
k
X

⎛

|H|
X

⎝
j=1 m>j

xij −

i=1

|H|
X

⎞2
xim ⎠

(4.1)

i=1

where X is the hotspot objects to IB association matrix and xij is a binary variable
that indicates the assignment of the ith hotspot to j th IB. The total number of hotspots
P
in the j th IB is given as |H|
i=1 xij .
The second objective function is to minimize the number boundary objects shared
among IBs while choosing the maximum number of hotspot objects as boundary
objects. The intuition behind minimizing the number of boundary objects is to
increase the latency associated with the damage propagation across IBs when an
attack occurs either on an internal or on a boundary data object. At the same time,
choosing hotspot objects as boundary objects can improve the overall availability by
using the backup table to provide correct versions for the corrupted objects without
waiting for the recovery mechanism to ﬁnish. The objective function f2 is given by
the following expression.

f2 = max |A> W |1

(4.2)

where A is binary vector that indicates if a hotspot object is a boundary object, and
W is a vector that models the weight of the hotspot. The ﬁrst-norm used in f2 favors
hotspots with large weight as boundary objects. The minimization of the function f2
implies choosing the minimum number of boundary objects as the hotspots with the
largest weights. The overall ACHDP is given as the following.

Minimize
X

f1 + f2

subject to
k
X

xij − 1 ≤ kai ,

∀i ∈ {1, ..., |H|}

(4.3)

j=1

2−

k
X
j=1

xij ≤ k(1 − ai ),

∀i ∈ {1, ..., |H|}

(4.4)
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k
X
j=1
r
X
i=1
h
X
i=1

yij = 1

∀i ∈ {1, ..., |R|}

(4.5)

yij ≥ 1

∀j ∈ {1, ..., k}

(4.6)

zi,m −

h
X

zi,m ∗ xi,j ≥ h ∗ (1 − ym,j )

(4.7)

i=1

∀m ∈ {1, ..., |R|}, j ∈ {1, ..., k}
ai , ymj , xij ∈ {0, 1}

(4.8)

∀i ∈ {1, . . . , |H|}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , |R|}
Constraints (4.3) and (4.4) collectively set the variable bi = 1 if the ith hotspot
object is shared among two or more IBs, i.e. boundary hotspot objects, and 0 otherwise. Constraint (4.5) expresses the constraint that each role is assigned to one IB
only, while constraint (4.6) assures that no IB is empty. Constraint (4.7) expresses
that if role ri is assigned to an IB, then all its hotspot objects are assigned to that
IB. Finally, the last constraint restricts the decision variables to binary variables.
Theorem 4.1.1 The ACHDP is NP-hard.
Proof The proof of this theorem is the same as the proof of Theorem 3.1.1.

4.2

Heuristics for the Access Control and Hotspot Demarcation Problem
We have developed two heuristics for the ACHDP. Both algorithms take the num-

ber of IBs, the set of roles associated with the RBAC policy, and the set of hotspot
objects as input. The output of these algorithms is a role-to-IB assignment. The
algorithms start with an empty IB assignment set and iteratively assign roles to IBs
based on greedy decision that tries to minimize optimization objectives. The ﬁrst
algorithm, termed Role-based First-ﬁt Assignment (RFA), assigns transactions such
that the size of IBs is balanced. The second algorithm, termed Role-based Best-ﬁt
Assignment (RBA), attempts to reduce the number of boundary objects produced
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by the IB assignment. Detailed discussion about each algorithm is presented in the
following sections.

4.2.1

Role-based First-Fit Assignment

The pseudocode for RFA is listed in Algorithm 7. The algorithm starts with an
¯ (Line 2).
empty assignment set S (Line 1). Roles are sorted and stored in the set R
¯ (Line 3-13). In each iteration,
Next, the algorithm iterates over each transaction in R
the IB that has the smallest number of internal objects is found (Lines 5-11) and
denoted as IBmin . The role is then assigned to IBmin as shown in Line 12. Lines
14-16 populate the assignment set with the assigned IBs.
Lemma 4.2.1 The complexity of RFA is O(r log r + nkr).
Proof RFA sorts the set of roles based on the number of hotspot objects in each
transaction (Line 3). Sorting has a runtime complexity of O(r log r). The loop in
Lines 3-13 assigns a single role to the IB with the smallest size. Thus, the loop has a
runtime complexity of O(nkr). The overall complexity of RFA is O(r log r + nkr).

4.2.2

Role-based Best-ﬁt Assignment

The pseudocode for RBA is listed in Algorithm 8. The algorithm starts with an
empty assignment set S as shown in Line 1. The algorithm assigns a single transaction
to each empty IB (Lines 3-9). In Line 10, the roles are sorted based on number of
hotspot objects in an ascending order. At this point, the IBs are guaranteed to have
¯
the least overlapping objects among all the transactions, since the ﬁrst k roles in R
are those that have the least number of hotspot shared objects. For the remaining
¯ each transaction r is assigned to the IB that shares the largest number
roles in R,
of hotspot objects (Lines 11-21). In particular, the set of assigned transactions that
overlap with r is stored in N IB (Line 12). Thus, N IB contains the set of all IBs
that share objects with r. If the set N IB is not empty, the role r is assigned to the
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ALGORITHM 7: Role-based First-ﬁt Assignment
Input: R, H, k
Output: S = {IB1 , ..., IBk }
1.

S=∅

2.

R̄ ← Sort roles based on number of hotspot objects in ascending order

3.

¯ do
for r ∈ R

4.

IBmin = null

5.

for i = 1, . . . , k do

6.

sizei ← Compute the number of internal objects in IBi

7.

if sizei < min size then

8.

min size = sizei

9.

IBmin = ibi
end

10.
11.

end

12.

ibmin = ibmin ∪ r

13.

end

14.

for i = 1, . . . , k do

15.

S = S ∪ {IBi }

16.

end

17.

return S

IB that has the largest number of hotspot objects with r (Line 14-16). Otherwise, r
is assigned to the smallest IB in S (Line 17).
Lemma 4.2.2 The complexity of RBA is O(nr2 + kr).
Proof The loop in Lines 3-10 assigns a single role to each empty IB. Thus, the
loop has a runtime complexity of O(k). Then, RBA assigns roles to the best-ﬁt IB
(Lines 11-21). The runtime complexity of ﬁnding the set N T and N IB is O(nr)
(Line 12). Finding ibmax , the IB that has the largest number of objects shared with
t, and assigning t in Lines 13-19 has a runtime complexity of O(nk). The runtime
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ALGORITHM 8: Role-based Best-ﬁt Assignment
Input: R, H, k
Output: S = {IB1 , ..., IBk }
1.

S=∅

2.

AR = ∅

3.

for i = 1, . . . , k do

4.

r ← pick the largest roles in R

5.

IBi = {r}

6.

S = S ∪ {IBi }

7.

Add r to AR

8.

Remove r from R

9.

end

10.

R̄ ← Sort roles on the number of hotspot objects in ascending order

11.

for r ∈ R̄ do

12.

Find N IB, the set of IBs that overlap with r

13.

if N IB 6= ∅ then

14.

Find IBmax ∈ N IB that has the largest number of hotspot objects shared with r

15.

IBmax = IBmax ∪ r

16.

else
Assign r to the smallest IB

17.

end

18.
19.

end

20.

ibmin = ibmin ∪ r

21.

end

22.

for i = 1, . . . , k do

23.

S = S ∪ {IBi }

24.

end

25.

return S
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complexity for assigning all the roles is O(r(nr + nk)). The overall complexity of
RBA is O(k + nr2 + knr), i.e., approximately O(nr2 + kr).

4.3

Modiﬁed Intrusion Management Architecture

4.3.1

Hotspot Synchronization Module

In this section, we present the integrated hotspot synchronization module with
PIMS architecture. The modiﬁed architecture is depicted in Figure 4.1. The objective
of the hotspot synchronization module is to maintain correct versions of hotspot
objects in the backup table in order to provide correct information when a malicious
transaction is detected. With proper synchronization operations between the backup
table and data table, the number of blocked transactions in the presence of malicious
activities is expected to be reduced. The reason is that when a transaction, say tm , is
detected as malicious, the intrusion response manager identiﬁes all the objects that
have been updated during the period between the commit time tcm and the detection
time tdm . Let such set be called B, which is the set of blocked objects because of
malicious transaction tm . We can further divide the set B into two subsets, namely
Bm and Bo . The subset Bm is the set of objects updated by tm , while Bo is the set
of objects updated by other transactions during the period [tcm ,tdm ].
Any transaction that requests to read from the set B will be blocked. However, any
update request to an object in B is allowed to proceed and the object is removed from
B. The remaining objects in B are shared with the RECS, which repairs the damage
by a series of undo and redo operations. In particular, the repair manager performs
undo operations to all malicious and aﬀected transactions and then performs redo
operations for the aﬀected transactions only. Thus, the database operation remains
correct. Meanwhile, the set of blocked transactions are only resumed once the recovery
manager completes repairing the objects in B, and thus reducing the availability and
increasing the average response time.
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Fig. 4.1. Modified PIMS architecture including the access control enforcement and hotspot synchronization modules.

Now, we describe the advantage of the using a backup table for the hotspots. Let
Bh be the set of hotspots in B. The objects in the intersection set Bh ∩Bm are backed
up from the backup table and removed from B. As a result, all transactions request
to read from that set are executed without delay. Note that backed up objects in the
intersection set Bh ∩Bo is not correct since the repair manager overwrites these objects
with the correct versions after the redo operations are done. The synchronization
protocol is pictorially depicted in Figure 4.2. The synchronization protocol is applied
for all committed transactions. It consists of three synchronization operations as
listed in Algorithm 9.

Forward synchronization
This operation is activated when a transaction is detected as malicious. In this
operation, all hotspot objects that have been updated by the malicious transaction
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Fig. 4.2. Pictorial representation of the synchronization mechanism.

and not updated by other transactions afterwards are identiﬁed. Subsequently, the
correct versions are copied from the backup table to the data table.

Backward synchronization
This operation is activated when a transaction is neither detected as malicious
nor aﬀected after waiting for an interval which is equal to the IDS delay. In this
operation, all hotspot objects update by the transaction are copied to the backup
table.

Two-way synchronization
This operation is activated when the recovery of the malicious transactions is
completed. In this operation, the new versions of all recovered hotspot objects are
copied to both backup and data tables.

4.3.2

Illustration of Hotspot Synchronization Mechanism

To illustrate the functionality of the hotspot synchronization mechanism, we
present few scenarios that explain the advantages and limitations of the proposed
hotspot-based response and recovery mechanisms. First, we provide an overview of
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ALGORITHM 9: Synchronization Protocol
1.

Function Forward Synchronization (tm , τc , τd )
/* Invoked when a transaction is detected as malicious

2.

*/

Bm ← Find set of updated objects by tm and not by any other transactions during
[τc , τd ]

3.

Hb ← set of hotspot objects in Bm

4.

Back up all objects in Hb from backup table

5.

Function Backward Synchronization (ti )
/* Invoked when a transaction is not detected as malicious

6.

Bi ← Find set of updated objects by ti

7.

Hb ← set of hotspot objects in Bi

8.

if Ti is not aﬀected then

9.
10.
11.

*/

Copy the objects in Hb to backup table
end
Function Two-way Synchronization (tm )
/* Invoked when recovery manager is finished

12.

Sm ← Set of repaired objects as a result of malicious transaction tm

13.

Hb ← set of hotspot objects in Sm

14.

Copy the objects in Hb to backup table

*/

the operations performed by PIMS. The operations are illustrated in Figure 4.3. Various events at which RESS and RECS perform response and recovery operations are
marked on the timeline. The red crosses depict arrival events of transactions in the
workload. The events associated with the malicious transaction tm are summarized
in Table (a) of Figure 4.3. Once tm is detected as malicious at time τb , the RESS
starts generating a set comprising of potentially corrupted objects at τc . It ﬁnds all
objects that are updated during the interval between τa and τb . Subsequently, the
RESS updates B with the approximated corrupted objects set at τc , which also marks
the end of the RESS procedure and the start of RECS procedure. A blocking window
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Fig. 4.3. Illustration of Response and Recovery Mechanisms of PIMS.

is activated between τc and τe , in which all newly arriving transactions are blocked.
Meanwhile at τc , currently active transactions are not pre-empted and eventually
commit at τd . Once all active transactions are committed, RECS starts identifying
the complete set of aﬀected transactions and accordingly updates B by removing benign objects. Similarly, a set to-repair objects (R) is updated by adding objects that
are previously updated by aﬀected transactions during interval [τc ,τe ]. During the
interval [τe , τf ], the corrupted objects are progressively cleansed and released. RECS
procedure terminates at τz . The actions taken by the AC for new arrival at each
point of the red crosses is shown in Table (b) in Figure 4.3.
The hotspot synchronization scenarios are shown in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. In
each ﬁgure, the transaction workload and hotspot objects set is shown in the upper
right corner. The transactions are executed in the following order (t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 ). The
malicious transaction is highlighted with red color (which is t1 for all the scenarios).
The timeline labeled as b in each ﬁgure shows the execution events of the transactions
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without the hotspot mechanisms, while the timeline labeled as c shows the execution
events of the transactions with the hotspot mechanisms. Using these scenarios, we
illustrate the eﬀect on the performance of the proposed hotspot-based response and
recovery mechanisms due to the inter-transaction dependency with the malicious
transaction and the arrival pattern exhibited by the benign transactions.

Scenario 1: Depicting the Eﬀect of Inter-Transaction Dependency
In this scenario, transactions t2 , t3 , and t4 are blocked when the hotspot mechanism is not deployed as shown in Figure 4.4. The reason is that t1 updates objects
o2 , which is added to the blocked set, i.e., at the end of the response period. As a
result, t2 and t3 are blocked since they attempt to read o2 . Consequently, t4 is also
blocked since it attempts to read o5 .
When the hotspot mechanism is present, transactions t2 , t3 , and t4 are not blocked.
This is because that once t1 is detected as malicious, the forward synchronization
operation is activated and o2 is backed up. As a result, o2 is not included in B and
thus t3 and t4 are not blocked.

Scenario 2: Depicting the Eﬀect of the Transaction Arrival Pattern
In this scenario, the transaction workload is similar to scenario 1. However, t2
arrives before t1 is detected as malicious as shown in Figure 4.5. As a result, t2 is not
blocked; however, it is identiﬁed as an aﬀected transaction at the end of the blocking
window and hence is included in the recovery procedure. Transactions t3 and t4 are
blocked due to inter-transaction dependencies. This scenario indicates that under this
type of arrival patterns, hotspot backup mechanism cannot prevent t2 from becoming
an aﬀected transaction.

74
H={!" }
Quarantine
window

Blocking
Window

B={o2,o4}

B={o2,o4}

Repair
Window

$% : *%
$" : *"
$& : *&
$# : *#

!%
!"
!"
!-

+% !"
+" !#
+& !+& !.

a) Transaction
workload

Transaction
actions

$% commits
$" commits
$% starts
$" starts

$% is
$% response
malicious completed

$% recovery
$#
completed $& starts $# starts
blocked

Recovery period

Response period

B={o4}

Transaction
actions

$" is benign
(affected)

$&
blocked

B={!4}

$& commits
$% commits
$" commits $% detected $% response
$% recovery
$" is benign
$% starts
malicious completed $& starts
$" starts
(affected) $# starts completed

Synchronization
operations

b) Execution
timeline without
hotspot
mechanism

Backward
Synchronization
(Copy !# to
backup)

Forward
Synchronization
(backup !" )

$# commites

c) Execution
timeline with
hotspot
mechanism

Two-way
Synchronization
(Copy !# to
backup)

Fig. 4.4. Hotspot synchronization scenario 1.
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Fig. 4.5. Hotspot synchronization scenario 2.

Scenario 3: Depicting the Joint Eﬀect of Inter-Transaction Dependency
and Transaction Arrival Pattern
In this scenario, we assume that t3 is dependent on t2 (by reading o4 ). Without
any hotspot mechanism, transactions t3 and t4 are blocked similar to the previous
scenarios as shown in Figure 4.6.
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Fig. 4.6. Hotspot synchronization scenario 3.

However, in the presence of hotspot mechanism t3 and t4 are still blocked. This
is because that t2 is identiﬁed as an aﬀected transaction and hence the blocked set
is B = {o4 }. Note, o2 is backed up by the hotspot mechanism and hence is removed
from B. However, such removal does not provide any advantage for subsequent arrival
of t3 and t4 .

4.4

Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the integrated access

control and hotspot model and architecture. First, we discuss the synthetic workload
and evaluate the performance of the proposed ACHDP heuristics. Finally, we conduct system evaluation of the integrated RBAC-hotspot PIMS using the synthesized
workloads and present the evaluation results.
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4.4.1

Synthetic Access-Controlled Skewed Workload

In this section, we present the performance of the proposed heuristics of the
ACHDP. We evaluate the performance using a workload of 5000 transactions generated using the method discussed in Section 3.4.2. The transactions are randomly
assigned to 100 roles such that each transaction is assigned to a single role. In order
to create the set of hotspot objects in the workload, each transaction is repeated with
a uniformly distributed number between 1 and 10. We evaluate the performance of
the heuristics using four metrics: the value of the objective function, the number of
generated boundary objects, the percentage of the hotspot objects in the boundary
object set, and the fairness index. For the equation of the fairness index, we modify
Equation 3.19 as the following.

J (IB1 , IB2 , . . . , IBk ) =

(

Pk

k·

Hotspot 2
|)
i=1 |IBi
Pk
Hotspot 2
|
i=1 |IBi

(4.9)

where |IBiHotspot | denotes the number of hotspot objects in IBi .

4.4.2

Heuristics Evaluation

Figure 4.7 depicts the performance of the proposed heuristics, namely, RBA and
RFA. The ﬁgure demonstrates that RBA, in general, outperforms RFA. In particular, Figure 4.7(b) illustrates that RBA selects less number of boundary objects as
compared to RFA. However, in both RBA and RFA, the number of boundary objects increase as k increases. Figure 4.7(c) illustrates that, for larger value of k, the
fairness of RBA degrades as compared to RFA. The reason is that RBA generates
imbalanced assignment in favor of reducing the number of boundary objects. Figure
4.7(d) illustrates that both RBA and RFA selects more than 70% of boundary objects
as hotspots.
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Fig. 4.7. Eﬀect of k on a workload of 5000 transactions and 100 roles.

4.4.3

Evaluation Results

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the the integrated PIMS architecture using MTB. The experiments setup in this section is similar to the setup
discussed in Section 3.4.3. In the ﬁrst experiment, we discuss the eﬀect of varying the
number of IBs using two sizes for the hotspots backup table, i.e., 25% and 50% for
number of objects. We denote the results of RBA and RFA using 25% with RBA 25%
and RFA 25%, respectively. The same denotation is used for 50%. In the ﬁrst experiment, we vary the number of IBs. The results are depicted in Figure 4.8. In the
case when the size of hotspot backup table is 25% of the total table, the number of
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aﬀected transaction decreases when k increases as illustrated in Figure in 4.8(a). The
reason is that as k increases, more boundary objects is selected and thus blocking
incoming transactions from reading corrupted objects. However, this results in an
increase in the number blocked transaction (Figure 4.8(b)).
Moreover, we observe that partitioning reduces the recovery time by 25%, but
increases the response time by 23% as demonstrated in Figures 4.8(c) and 4.8(d),
respectively. In the case when the size of hotspot backup table is 50% of the total
table, on the other hand, the increase in the response time is smaller. In particular, the
response time overhead is at least 12% for IBs > 5 (Figure 4.8(d)), which suggests that
using providing larger backup table for hotspots improves the overall performance.
In the second experiments, we vary the number of hotspot objects with k =
1 and k = 5 as depicted in Figure 4.9. Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) illustrate that
increasing the number of hotspots reduces both the number of aﬀected and blocked
transactions. The reason is that more corrupted objects are recovered without waiting
for recovery to ﬁnish. As a result, the recovery time is reduced (Figure 4.9(c)). We
also observe that the average response time is reduced by 40% when the hotspot
objects is increased to 50% because there are less number of blocked transactions.

4.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, the problem of the response and recovery of successful intrusion

attacks on a DBMS with access control is addressed. We modify the PIMS architecture to integrate the access control enforcement and hotspot synchronization modules.
We introduce a data partitioning scheme for skewed access-controlled workload with
the objective to limit the extent of the damage into partitions. We formulate the
integrated access control and hotspot IB demarcation problem as a multi-objective
optimization problem and prove its hardness. Accordingly, we propose two eﬃcient
heuristic algorithms. We show that using hotspot backup tables of 50% of the number

79
80
RBA_0.25
RFA_0.25
RBA_0.5
RFA_0.5

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

1

5

Number of all blocked transactions

Number of affected transactions

90

70
60
50
40
30

10
0

10

RBA_0.25
RFA_0.25
RBA_0.5
RFA_0.5

20

1

5

k

(a) Aﬀected transactions

(b) Blocked transactions

RBA_0.25
RFA_0.25
RBA_0.5
RFA_0.5

180
170
160
150
140
130
120

1

5

10

k

(c) Average recovery time

30
Average response time (ms)

Average recovery time (ms)

190

10

k

RBA_0.25
RFA_0.25
RBA_0.5
RFA_0.5

25
20
15
10
5
0

1

5

10

k

(d) Average response time

Fig. 4.8. Eﬀect of k on a workload of 5000 transactions with π = 10%,
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of objects can reduce the response time by 40% as compared to 25% backup table
size.
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5. THREAT MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE FOR
TIME-CONSTRAINED DATA-CENTRIC
INTERNET-OF-THINGS COLLABORATIVE SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we present the integrated architecture of PIMS for data-centric IoTbased collaborative systems. Moreover, we introduce the deﬁnition and the formulation of data-driven containment region demarcation problem, prove its hardness,
and present two eﬃcient heuristics. Finally, we present and discuss the performance
evaluation results.

5.1

Motivating Example
Figure 5.1 depicts an Internet-based collaborative application of a global-scale

organization. Diﬀerent departments in the organization, e.g., Sales, Marketing, Accounting, and IT, access a centralized ﬁnancial database to perform business workﬂows and administration tasks.

Individuals in each department issue workﬂow-

transactions using their computers, phones, or specialized devices. Suppose that a
user A in the IT department executes a malicious transaction that tampers with the
shared database. The IDS detects the malicious transaction and triggers an alarm
to the security administrator, which temporarily blocks incoming transactions and
starts the recovery procedure. Any subsequent accesses to the corrupted data are
either blocked or delayed. As a result, the organization’s operations can be aﬀected.
In the above example, the recovery time depends on the number of dependent
transactions that are executed before the IDS detects the malicious transaction. Even
a single attack can cause a catastrophic cascading eﬀects due to data dependency
and applications interoperability. Consequently, the availability of the DIoTCS is
impaired when the recovery process takes a long time. Therefore, a holistic approach
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for designing a threat management mechanism that detects, conﬁnes, and recovers
the damage across the whole DIoTCS as early as possible is needed.

5.2

The Architecture of DIoTCS
The IoT interconnects billions of heterogeneous devices and objects through the

Internet. The architecture of the IoT is divided into three layers [71]: i) perception
layer, ii) network layer, and iii) application layer. Figure 5.2 illustrates the three-layer
architecture of the IoT. The perception layer represents the physical devices, i.e., sensors and actuators, that aim to collect data, process the collected data, and transmit
the information to upper layers. IoT devices perform diﬀerent functionalities such
as sensing temperature, detecting motion, and querying locations. Network layer is
responsible for routing the processed information, which is received by the perception
layer, to the high-level IoT application layer. The network layer interconnects heterogeneous networks using various communication technologies (e.g., 6LoWPAN and
Zigbee), and protocols, (e.g., Constraint Application Protocol, Advanced Message
Queuing Protocol, and Data Distribution Service ) [72]. The application layer is the
top layer in the IoT architecture that receives the data and processes information to
provide high-level services and operations that are required by the customers.
IoT devices generate unprecedented amounts of data that can overwhelm the
resource-constrained IoT devices. Cloud computing is used to provide scalable on-
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Financial
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Fig. 5.1. A motivating example for a DIoTCS.
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Fig. 5.2. Three-layer IoT architecture.

demand storage and processing services [73]. However, the long delay caused by
transferring data to the cloud and back to the IoT devices is unacceptable for latencysensitive IoT applications, e.g., health-monitoring and emergency response. In addition, transferring all the collected data to the cloud would unnecessarily saturate the
network. To address these issues, fog and edge computing are used to provide cloudlike resources near to the IoT devices for local data storage and processing [74–76].
Figure 5.3 illustrates the fog computing architecture for database-backed IoT applications.

5.3

Data-Driven Containment Region Demarcation
In this section, we propose a new model to represent the inter-transaction de-

pendencies and execution time-constraints in DIoTCS. Subsequently, we present a
data-driven containment region demarcation problem and formulate it as a costdriven optimization problem. We prove that the problem is NP-hard and present
two eﬃcient heuristics to solve the problem in polynomial time.

5.3.1

Time-Constrained Transaction Execution Graph Model

An IoT-based application consists of transactions that operate on a set of n data
objects denoted by D = {o1 , o2 , . . . , on }. We model the execution of transactions in
DIoTCS as a weighted graph T T EG = {V, E, W }, where V represents a set of trans-
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actions T that are executed by the collaborative users, E is a set of edges representing
dependencies among transactions, and W is a labeling function over the set of edges,
i.e., W : E → R2 .
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The label on each edge eij ∈ E between two transactions ti and tj is a pair
< STij , δij >. The ﬁrst label is STij that represents the set of objects that are shared
between ti and tj , i.e., STij = Wti ∩ Rtj . The second label is δij that represents
the time limit of executing transaction tj after transaction ti is executed. Failure to
meet this time requirement may result in an incorrect or unsafe operation of DIoTCS.
The parameters of the model are incurred from the Quality-of-Service provided by
DIoTCS. For example, the execution graph model for a set of transactions T =
{t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 , t5 , t6 , t7 , t8 , t9 , t10 } is depicted in Figure 5.4(a). In the ﬁgure, t2 depends
on t1 because t2 reads 25 objects that have been updated by t1 . The time constraints
between t1 and t2 is 500 ms, which indicates that transaction t2 must be executed
within 500 ms after the successful execution of t1 .
We refer to the transaction that tampers with the data as a malicious transaction. On the other hand, a transaction is termed aﬀected if it directly (or indirectly)
depends on a malicious transaction. For example, assume that Transaction t3 is malicious in Figure 5.4(a). Then Transactions t4 , t5 , t7 and t6 are aﬀected transactions.
All malicious and aﬀected transaction are invalid transactions.

5.3.2

Containment Regions Demarcation Problem

The objective of the demarcation problem is to assign the transactions to k Containment Regions (CRs). The advantage of the demarcation is to conﬁne the damage into a single CR without severely aﬀecting the execution time-constraints of the
transactions that are modeled by TTEG. The demarcation problem is deﬁned as the
following,
Deﬁnition 5.3.1 (Containment Region Demarcation Problem) Given the TTEG that
is created using a set of transactions T over a set of n objects, CRDP is to demarcate
TTEG into k CRs, such that the number of shared objects among transactions that
are assigned to diﬀerent CRs, and the response time overhead are minimized.
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The demarcation of CRs is controlled by the shared objects among transactions
of collaborative users as well as the execution time-constraints of the transactions.
We formulate the CRDP as a dual-objective optimization problem. The ﬁrst objective function focuses on the containment of damage among transactions assigned to
diﬀerent CRs. It is suﬃcient to minimize the number of shared objects, represented
by |STij |, in the edges crossing the CRs. Thus, the objective function can be deﬁned
as the following.
Pk
f1 (X) =

`=1

Pm Pm
|STij |xi` (1 − xj` )
i=1
Pj=1
e∈E |STe |

(5.1)

where X is the transactions to CR assignment matrix, i.e., xij = 1 if the ith transaction
P
is assigned to the j th CR and 0, otherwise, and e∈E |STe | is the sum of the number
of shared objects among all transactions. We refer to the shared objects that their
transactions are assigned to diﬀerent CRs as boundary objects. The intuition behind
minimizing the number of boundary objects is to limit the damage propagation across
CRs.
The second objective function is to minimize the eﬀect of partitioning on the
transactions’ execution time-constraints of the transactions. It is suﬃcient to partition the TTEG such the crossing edges among CRs has the maximum delay weights.
Equivalently, it is suﬃcient to minimize the the sum of delay weights of the internal
edges. Formally, the objective of minimizing the eﬀect on time can be expressed in
the following way.
Pk

`=1

f2 (X) =

Pm Pm
δij xi` xj`
i=1
P j=1
e∈E δe

(5.2)

Accordingly, CRDP is formulated as a mixed integer non-linear programming
using objective functions 5.1 and 5.2 as the following.
Minimize
X

f1 (X) + f2 (X)

subject to
|

m
X
i=1

xij |ti | −

m
X
i=1

xi` |ti || ≤ 2

m
k

∀j 6= ` ∈ {1, ..., k}

(5.3)
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k
X
j=1
m
X

xij = 1

∀i ∈ {1, ..., m}

(5.4)

xij ≥ 1

∀j ∈ {1, ..., k}

(5.5)

i=1

xij ∈ {0, 1}

(5.6)

∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
The result of the optimization problem is the transactions-to-CR assignment matrix X. Constraint 5.3 enforces a balanced transactions assignment to CRs. Constraint 5.4 forces the assignment of a transaction to one CR, while Constraint 5.5
prevent empty CRs. Constraint 5.6 limits X to be binary. An example of CR assignment that results from solving CRDP with k = 3 is depicted in Figure 5.4(b).
Transactions t1 , t2 , and t3 are assigned to CR1 . Transactions t4 , t5 , and t6 are assigned
to CR2 , while transactions t7 , t8 , t9 , and t10 are assigned to CR3 .

5.3.3

Control of Containment Regions in Collaborative Systems

The CR assignment matrix is stored in the CR assignment table that is used by
TMS when DIoTCS is encountering attacks. More details about the response and recovery mechanisms is provided in the next section. The CRs can be implemented using
physical or logical partitioning of the database. Physical partitioning of the database
require placing CRs in diﬀerent machines, e.g., using Cloud computing platforms.
In this paper, we assume that DIoTCS uses a globally-shared database, in which all
the IoT-based systems’s transactions are executed. CRs are implemented as a logical
partitioning using ACLs. Fine-grained ACL, e.g. Oracle VPD [13], and MS SQL [24],
that controls access at the tuple-level are familiar in commercial and open-source
Database Management Systems (DBMSs), which are wildly used in DIoTCS [4].
Theorem 5.3.1 The CRDP is NP-hard.
Proof We ﬁrst formulate the decisional CRDP as the following: Given TTEG, does
there exist a valid partition into k CRs such that f1 (X) + f2 (X) ≤ Q?. The proof
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is by reduction from the Partition problem. First, a valid solution to the decisional
CRDP can be checked in polynomial time. Thus, CRDP is in NP. Second, we show
that CRDP contains the Partition problem as a special case. Let the set of items
A in the partition problem be the set of transactions T , i.e., s(a) = |t| ∀a ∈ A and
t ∈ T ,  = 0, and Q = 0. We restrict the set of transactions T to be non-overlapping,
6 j. Thus STe = 0 ∀e ∈ E. Moreover, let δe = 0 for every e ∈ E.
i.e., ti ∩ tj = ∅ ∀i =
Thus, w(e) = {0, 0} ∀e ∈ E. We claim that there exists a solution to the decisional
CRDP problem if and only if there exists a solution to the Partition problem over set
P
P
A, i.e., a∈A s(a) = a∈A0 s(a).
Suppose that theres exists a valid solution to the decisional CRDP, then the
P
solution is also a valid solution to the Partition problem because | m
i=1 xi1 |ti | −
Pm
P
P
i=1 xi2 |ti || ≤ 0 which implies that
a∈A s(a) =
a∈A0 s(a). On the other direction,
suppose that there exists a solution to the partition problem, then the solution is
also a valid solution for the decisional CRDP since f1 (X) + f2 (X) ≤ 0 and other
constraints are satisﬁed.

5.4

Heuristics for the Demarcation Problem
We propose two eﬃcient greedy-based heuristics to solve the CRDP. All algorithms

take the number of CRs and TTEG as input. The output is the transactions-to-CR
assignment. The algorithms start with empty CR assignment and iteratively assign
transactions to CR based on greedy decisions that optimize the objective functions.
The ﬁrst heuristic is termed Edge-Based Assignment (EBA) that attempts to minimize the value of the objective functions by searching for the best CR for each
transaction. The second heuristic is termed Neighbor-Based Assignment (NBA) that
traverses over transactions in a depth-ﬁrst order and assigns each transaction to the
smallest CR. Detailed discussion about each algorithm is presented in the following
sections.
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5.4.1

Edge-Based Assignment

EBA is listed in Algorithm 10. The algorithm starts with the empty CR assignment set S and empty assigned transactions set A (Line 1). Then, the algorithm loops
until all transactions are assigned (Lines 2-27). For each transaction t, the set of neighboring transactions (InN eighbors) that have edge coming into t is found (Line 4). If
InN eighbors is empty, then t is assigned to the smallest CR. Otherwise, the CRs of
each ”assigned” transaction tn ∈ InN eighbors are stored in f easibleCR (Lines 1115). If f easibleCR is not empty, then t is assigned to the ”best” CR ∈ f easibleCR,
which has the minimum value of objective function (Lines 16-19). Otherwise, t is
assigned to the best CR in S (Lines 20-23).
Lemma 5.4.1 The complexity of EBA is O(|E||T |2 ), where |T | is number of transactions and |E| is number of edges.
Proof The loop in Lines (2-27) assigns a single transaction to each empty CR.
Thus the loop has a running complexity of O(|T |). During each iteration, the set of
InN eighbors is found (Line 4), which has a running complexity of O(|E|). Assigning
and evaluating the objective function in Lines 17 and 21 have running complexity of
O(k|E||T |). Thus, ﬁnding the best CR among k CRs has a running complexity of
O(k 2 |E||T |). The overall running complexity of EBA is O(|T |(|E| + k 2 |E||T |)) which
is approximately O(|E||T |2 ).
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ALGORITHM 10: Edge-Based Assignment
Input: T EG, k
Output: S = {CR1 , ..., CRk }
1.

Let S = ∅, A = ∅

2.

for t ∈ T do

3.

Let assigned = f alse

4.

Let InN eighbors = {tj ∈ T |eji ∈ E}

5.

if InNeighbors is empty then

6.

Assign t to the smallest CR

7.

assigned = true

8.

end

9.

else

10.

Let f easibleCR = {}

11.

for tj ∈ InNeighbors do
if tj ∈ A then

12.

Add the CR of tj to feasibleCR

13.

end

14.
15.

end

16.

if f easibleCR is not empty then
Assign t to CRbest ∈ f easibleCR that minimizes the objective function and satisﬁes

17.

the constraints
Add t to A and set Assigned = true

18.
19.

end

20.

else
Assign t to CRbest ∈ S that minimizes the objective function and satisﬁes the

21.

constraints
Add t to A and set Assigned = true

22.
23.

end

24.

if assigned == f alse then
Assign t to the smallest CR ∈ S

25.

end

26.
27.

end

28.

end

29.

return S
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5.4.2

Neighbor-Based Assignment

NBA is listed in Algorithm 11. The algorithm starts with the empty CR assignment set S, empty assigned transactions set A, and an empty stack (Line 1). NBA
iterates over all transactions in T (Lines 2-31). During every iteration, a transaction t is selected, removed from T , and added to the stack (Lines 3-4). Then, NBA
loops until the stack is empty (Lines 5-30). After a transaction ti is popped from
the stack (Line 6), the sets of OutN eighbors and InN eighbors are found (Lines 89). NBA adds each transaction tn ∈ OutN eighbors into the stack (Lines 10-12). If
InN eighbors is empty, ti is assigned to the smallest CR (Lines 13-15). Otherwise,
the CRs of each assigned transaction tj ∈ InN eighbors are stored in f easibleCR
(Lines 18-2). If f easibleCR is not empty, then t is assigned to the smallest CR in
f easibleCR (Lines 23-25). Otherwise, t is assigned to the smallest CR in S (Lines
26-28). The assigned transaction ti is added to A (Line 29).
Lemma 5.4.2 The complexity of NBA is O(|T ||E|), where |T | is number of transactions and |E| is number of edges.
Proof The loop in Lines (2-31) iterates over all transactions in T . For every transaction t ∈ T , NBA iterates over t’s InN eighbors transactions by adding them to the
stack (Lines 5-30). Thus, the combined running complexity of the inner and outer
loop (Lines 2-31) is O(|T |). During each iteration, the set of InN eighbors is found
(Line 4), which has a running complexity of O(|E|). Assigning and evaluating the
objective function in Lines 17 and 21 have constant running complexity. Thus, ﬁnding
the best CR among k CRs has a running complexity of O(k). The overall running
complexity of NBA is O(|T |(|E| + k)) which is approximately O(|E||T |).
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ALGORITHM 11: Neighbor-Based Assignment
Input: T EG, k
Output: S = {CR1 , ..., CRk }
1.

Let S = ∅, A = {}, Stack ← {}

2.

while T is not empty do

3.

t ← pick a transaction t from T

4.

Add t to Stack and remove from T

5.

while Stack is not empty do

6.

ti ← pop from Stack

7.

CRtarget = −1

8.

Let OutN eighbors = {tj ∈ T |∃eij ∈ E}

9.

Let InN eighbors = {tj ∈ T |∃eji ∈ E}
for tn ∈ OutNeighbors do

10.

Add tn to Stack and remove from T

11.
12.

end

13.

if InNeighbors is empty then
Assign ti to the smallest CR

14.
15.

end

16.

else

17.

Let f easibleCR = {}

18.

for tj ∈ InNeighbors do
if tj ∈ A then

19.

Add the CR of tj to feasibleCR

20.

end

21.
22.

end

23.

if FeasibleCR is not empty then
Assign ti to smallest CR ∈ f easibleCR

24.
25.

end

26.

else
Assign ti to smallest CR

27.
28.

end

29.

Add ti to A
end

30.
31.

end

32.

end

33.

return S
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5.5

Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of TMS. First, we discuss

the synthetic workload used for the performance evaluation. Second, we evaluate the
performance of the proposed CR demarcation heuristics. Finally, we conduct system
evaluation of TMS using synthetic workload and present the performance results.

5.5.1

Synthetic Transactional Workload

In order to evaluate the performance of TMS, we have modiﬁed the proposed MTB
in Section 3.4.1 to simulate workﬂow-based transactional workload benchmark that
generates workﬂows consisting of dependent transactions. The dependency among
the transactions in the workﬂow ampliﬁes the potential damage that can be caused
by the malicious transactions. In essence, executing dependent transactions shortly
after the malicious transactions induces the spread of damage. Thus, the modiﬁed
MTB allows to asses the capability of intrusion management systems in conﬁning and
recover the damage without degrading the performance of DIoTCS.
The modiﬁed MTB simulates a collaborative ﬁnancial application as discussed in
Section 5.1. Each transaction resembles a fund transfer action among the accounts
of various enterprise departments. The transactions are issued by the Accounting
Department’s employees using IoT devices, e.g., mobile phones. In particular, the
modiﬁed MTB consists of a single data table, i.e., Funds, that has two attributes:
account id and balance. The modiﬁed MTB has three types of fund transfer transactions: distribute, collect, and many-to-many fund transfer. Distribute transaction
transfers fund from a single account to N other accounts; Collect transaction transfers
fund from M accounts to a single account; While many-to-many transactions transfers
fund from N accounts to another M accounts. The modiﬁed MTB is implemented
on an OLTP-benchmark testbed [65].
We now explain the process of generating a workﬂow-based workload of m transactions. We use four parameters to characterize the workload: 1) the number of
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workﬂows, 2) the maximum number of transactions in each workﬂow wmax , 3) the
amount of transferred fund γ, and 4) the maximum transaction size Sizemax . First,
each workﬂow is modeled as a `-ary tree, where each node represents a transaction.
We choose the value of ` from a uniform distribution with a range of [1, wmax
]. Then,
w
the size of each transaction in the workﬂow is chosen using a uniform distribution
with a range of [2,Sizemax ]. The type of the transaction is randomly selected from
distribute, collect, or many-to-many, while the value of γ is chosen from a uniform
distribution with range of [0.01,0.1].
For each pair of dependent transactions, two additional variables are used, i.e.,
SO and δ. SO is chosen from a uniform distribution with a range of [1, 10]. We
model δ as an exponential random variable with parameter λ. The values used for
λ are 0.001, 0.0006, and 0.0005. Accordingly, the transaction is generated. For the
experiments, we generate workloads with 100 workﬂows and 5000 transactions.

5.5.2

Heuristics Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed heuristics using synthetic transactional workload. We compare the performance of the proposed heuristics
with a Random Assignment (RA) technique, in which the transactions are assigned
to CRs randomly. Two metrics are used to evaluate the performance of the heuristics:
number of boundary objects and the assignment fairness index. The fairness index is
used to asses the performance in terms of size balancing among CRs. We use Jain’s
fairness index [67] to evaluate the fairness index in the following way.
P
( ki=1 |CRi |)2
J (CR1 , CR2 , . . . , CRk ) =
Pk
k · i=1
|CRi |2

(5.7)

where |CRi | is the number of transactions assigned to the ith CR.
In the ﬁrst experiment, we vary the number of CRs while ﬁxing the value of λ to
= 0.001. The number of boundary objects increases when k increases as illustrated in
Figure 5.5(a). This because that as k increases, the number of contained transactions
in each CR is reduced. As a result, the number of crossing edges among CRs increases
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Fig. 5.5. Eﬀect of k on a workload of 5000 transactions with λ = 0.001.

and thus increases the number of boundary objects. Notice that EBA produces less
number of boundary objects as compared to NBA and RA. This is because that EBA
performs a greedy decision to reduce the number of boundary objects when assigning
a transaction to a CR. NBA outperforms BFA and RA in terms of the fairness index
as illustrated in Figure 5.5(b). This is because that NBA is designed to produce
balanced assignments. The fairness index is reduced as the the value of k increases.
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In the next experiment, we study the eﬀect of varying the value of λ with k = 10.
The results are illustrated in Figure 5.6. The number of boundary objects remains
constant as the value of λ changes in the case of NBA. This is because that, for the
same value of k, the value of λ has no eﬀect on the number of boundary objects.
However, in the case of EBA the number of boundary objects increases as the value
of λ decreases. The reason is that the as the value of λ decreases, the average value
of δ increases (Recall that δ ∼ Exp(λ)). In this case, the value of f2 is minimized by
forcing the edges to cross CRs and thus increases the number of boundary objects.

5.5.3

Evaluation Results

The experiments are conducted on a Dell Power Edge R420 server with a 6-core
Intel E5-2620v3 CPU, 120 GB of RAM, and Ubuntu Server 16.0 LTS OS. We use
PostgreSQL 9.5 as the host DBMS. TMS is implemented using Java and connected to
PostgreSQL using JDBC. We use 20 workers (threads) for the admission controller and
unlimited pool of threads for the response and recovery procedures. Before each experiment, the Checking table is populated with 100,000 objects of unique account IDs
and initial balance of $10,000. We use B-tree index on Checking table to improve the
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query execution time. We assume that the transactions are submitted according to a
Poisson distribution with an arrival rate of 10. Furthermore, malicious transactions
are injected into the workload in a uniform distribution over time. The number of
malicious transactions is based on the attack intensity π, which is a percentage of the
total number of transactions.
We evaluate the performance of TMS using ﬁve metrics: 1) the number of affected transactions, 2) the number of blocked transactions, 3) the average recovery
time, 4) the average response time, and 5) the number of temporal constraints violations. The number of blocked transactions indicates the performance of TMS in
terms of availability. The number of aﬀected transactions is used to evaluate the
cost of damage. The average recovery time is computed based on the time taken
to recover the malicious and aﬀected transactions while the average response time is
computed based on the response time of all committed transactions. The number of
temporal constraints violations counts the number of transactions that failed to meet
the execution time-constraints. For the rest of the experiments, we set λ = 0.001 and
Δ = 100 ms, unless stated otherwise. We compare the performance of TMS using the
proposed heuristic, i.e., EBA, NBA, and RA, with ITDB [11]. In each experiment,
we run TMS with various values of k, i.e., 10, 20, 30, and 40. We did not notice any
further improvement in the performance beyond 40 CRs. We refer to TMS with k=1
as ”OneCR”.

Eﬀect of Attack Intensity
In this experiment, we compare the performance of TMS with ITDB as the value
of the attack intensity π increases. We use k = 10 for TMS using GA, NBA, and
RA assignments. The results are depicted in Figure 5.7. We observe that the extent
of the damage increases as the attack intensity increases. In particular, the number
of aﬀected transactions increases as the number of malicious transactions increases
(Figure 5.10(a)). The reason is that, for the same inter-transaction dependency, in-
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creasing the malicious transactions generates more aﬀected transactions. Notice that
the number of aﬀected transactions and average recovery time in TMS are reduced
by at least 78% and 45%, respectively, as compared to ITDB. The reason is that
TMS employs a delayed access mechanism that takes a proactive approach to stop
potential transaction from spreading the damage. However, the disadvantage of the
delayed access mechanism is the increase in the number of blocked transactions (by
at most 83%) and average response time (by at most 57%) as illustrated in Figure
5.10(b) and 5.10(d), respectively. We observe that EBA exhibits less response time
overhead as compared to NBA and RA. This is because that EBA generates the least
number of boundary objects among NBA and RA. Recall that in the case of OneCR
and ITDB, there are no boundary objects and thus the delayed access mechanism is
not active.
Notice that the average response time exhibits an increases as the attack intensity
increases (Figure 5.10(d)). The reason is that as the value of π increases, the number
of aﬀected transactions and the number of blocked transactions increase. Thus, the
blocking time of incoming transaction is prolonged.

Eﬀect of IDS Detection Delay
Figure 5.8 illustrates that increasing the intrusion detection delay from Δ = 100
to Δ = 1000 degrades the performance of TSM with k > 1 as compared to OneCR
and ITDB. The reason is that as Δ increases, the time required to release a boundary
tuple increases as speciﬁed by the delayed access mechanism. As a result, the number
of arriving transactions that request to read blocked boundary objects increases. Observe that, for the same Poisson arrival rate of 10, the number of aﬀected transaction,
the number blocked transactions, and the average recovery time does not change with
as Δ increases. However, the average response time increases as Δ increases due to
the delayed access mechanism. In conclusion, OneCR is more suitable for systems
with poor IDS performance (i.e. long detection delay). However, for systems with
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Fig. 5.7. Eﬀect of π on a workload of 5000 transactions with k =10,
δ = 100 ms, and λ = 0.001.

good IDS performance (i.e. Δ < 200) using TMS can achieve better performance (in
terms of damage containment) with low response time overhead.

Eﬀect of number of CRs
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of TMS with various values of
k, i.e., 10, 20, 30, and 40. We compare the results of EBA, NBA, RA with OneCR.
Refer to Figure 5.9. The experiment is conducted using Δ = 100 ms, λ = 0.001, and
π = 10%. As demonstrated in Figure 5.9, increasing k improves the performance of
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Fig. 5.8. Eﬀect of Δ on a workload of 5000 transactions with π = 10%
and λ = 0.001.

TMS. In particular, the number of aﬀected transactions is reduced by at least 62%.
Consequently, the average recovery time decreases as k increases. However, TMS
incurs at most 66% of response time overhead as illustrated in Figure 5.9(d). This is
due to the increase in the number of boundary objects. We note that the increase in
the response time overhead is marginal as the value of k increases beyond 10.
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Comparison with ITDB
In this experiment, we compare the performance of DTMS with ITDB [10]. Even
though OneCR and ITDB almost have the same number of aﬀected transaction with
the same attack intensity, OneCR encounters less recovery time as compared to ITDB.
The reason is that ITDB needs multiple passes on the transactions logs to ﬁnd AT [10],
while OneCR needs a single pass since it temporarily blocks transactions. However,
the overhead of blocking incoming transactions is an increase in the number of blocked
transactions and response time in OneCR as compared to ITDB.
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We note that the proposed response and recovery methodology, i.e., TMS, reduces
the number of aﬀected transactions by at least 33% as compared to ITDB. Consequently, the average recovery time is reduced by 50%, i.e., 150 msin TMS 10 BFA as
compared to 300 msin ITDB with 750 malicious transactions. The downside is that
TMS incurs larger number of blocked transaction due to blocking the transactions
that request to read boundary objects. The increase in the response time is around
60% as compared to ITDB. Nevertheless, the average response time for TMS does
not exceed 50 mswhen the attack intensity is 15%.
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Number of Violations of Temporal Constraints
In the next experiment, we study the performance of TMS with respect to the
number of violations of the temporal constraints as speciﬁed by the IoT application,
while varying the values of various parameters including k, π, Δ, and λ. Figure 5.11
highlights the interplay between two underlying processes: the application execution
process and the response and recovery process in the wake of attacks. The interplay
illustrates the trade-oﬀ between the threat-resiliency and the satisfaction of temporal
constrains speciﬁed by the DIoTCS application. We observe that the number of
transaction that violates the time-constraints increases as the values of k, π, and Δ
increases. The reason is that as the values of k and Δ increase, the access delay
mechanism blocks transactions temporarily in favor of damage containment. On the
other hand, increasing the value of π increases the number of aﬀected transactions
and thus increases the recovery time, which increases the blocking time of incoming
dependent transactions beyond their execution time-constraints.
From trade-oﬀ point of view, we observe that the partitioning-based TMS reduces
the number of aﬀected transactions by 81% with k = 10 (Figure 5.9(a)). On the
other hand, an increase in the response time incurs an increase of 30% in the number
of transactions violating their execution time-constraints. Nevertheless, increasing
the average execution time-constraints among transactions reduces the number of violating transactions as illustrated in Figure 5.11(d). In essence, we observe that in
order to achieve high threat-resilient DIoTCS applications, their temporal constrains
must be consonant with the IDS detection delay and the temporal dynamics associated with the threats embedded in the transaction workload. In particular, if the
threat intensity is high, transactions with shorter temporal constraints will incur high
number of violations.
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5.6

Conclusion
In this section, we propose a partitioning based intrusion management architec-

ture for DIoTCS that can endure intense intrusion attacks with minimum eﬀect on
the availability and response time. We present a new model that captures the dependencies and time of execution requirement among DIoTCS transactions. We propose
a data-driven partitioning scheme with the objective to limit the extent of the damage with low response time overhead. We formulate the demarcation problem as a
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dual-objective optimization problem, prove its hardness, and propose eﬃcient heuristic solutions. We present the architecture of TMS and conduct various experiments
to evaluate its performance. We show that, under intense malicious attacks, TMS
incurs response time overhead of at most 57%. However, the reduction in the number
of aﬀected transactions and recovery time is up to 78% and 45%, respectively.
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Section 6.1 summarizes the research contributions of this dissertation. Section 6.2
discusses the future research work.

6.1

Summary of Contributions
The research contributions of this dissertation are in the area of intrusion man-

agement in CBSs. In particular, we address the problem of intrusion attacks that
aim at tampering the data of a CBS. First, we propose a new real-time intrusion
management system, termed data-Partitioning-based Intrusion Management System,
that can endure intense malicious intrusion attacks on DBMSs. PIMS incorporates a
novel partition-based response and recovery mechanisms, which executes compensating transactions to automatically repair the damage caused by the intrusion attacks.
Accordingly, we present a data partitioning scheme that provides the ability to contain
the damage in conﬁned partitions. We formulate the partitioning problem, termed
IBDP, as a dual-objective optimization problem and prove its hardness. We propose
two heuristic solutions for IBDP and evaluate the performance of the intrusion management systems accordingly. Then, we consider access-controlled skewed, formulate
the related demarcation problem, and propose two heuristics. The advantage of the
new problem with access control and hotspots is to signiﬁcantly reduce the number
of variables as compared to IBDP.
The second contribution is extending the functionality of PIMS to design a timeaware threat management system for data-driven IoT-based collaborative systems.
Similar to PIMS, the objective of TMS to conﬁne the damage into partitions based
on the transactions execution time-constraints speciﬁed by the DIoTCS applications.
We model the transaction workload using a novel transaction execution graph and
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then formulate the partitioning problem as a cost-driven optimization problem. We
prove that the partitioning problem is NP-hard and accordingly propose two eﬃcient
heuristics.
The last contribution of this dissertation is the design and development of an
intrusion management benchmark. The novelty of the benchmark is the ability to
generate, orchestrate, and execute malicious transaction workload. The generated
workload can be conﬁgured using a wide-range of parameters in order simulate various
operations contexts. We have used the benchmark to evaluation the performance of
PIMS and TMS to demonstrate that intelligent data-partitioning improves the overall
availability of the CBSs that are undergoing intense intrusion attacks.

6.2

Future Work
The research presented in this dissertation can be extended into various directions.

In the following sections, we present few future research problems that can be pursued
as an extension of the work presented in this dissertation.

6.2.1

Resilient Intrusion Management using Attack Proﬁles

In this dissertation, we assume that existing IDS can be used to monitor, detect,
and alert PIMS (and TMS) in case of intrusion attacks [16, 17]. Although there are
several available IDSs that provide these functionalities, existing IDSs do not include
the capability of predicting if an incoming transaction is malicious. We plan to investigate data tampering attacks on DBMS and design a prediction model to estimate
the probability of receiving a malicious transaction. Consequently, the estimation
model can be incorporated in PIMS (and TMS) in order to design a more resilient
intrusion management system.
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6.2.2

Privacy-Aware Data Dissemination in Cloud-Assisted IoT Collaborating Systems

IoT-based collaborating systems uses Cloud computing paradigm to provide efﬁcient data storage and processing [77]. Collaborative users access shared data in
order to perform speciﬁc functions. For example, in recommendation systems, users
are asked to rate items, such as movies, products, etc. The data is disseminated to
the users based on the context, for example, location and proﬁle. However, users can
collude and hence reveal conﬁdential data. Therefore, a challenging problem is to
design a privacy-aware context-based data dissemination scheme to distribute conﬁdential data among collaborative, colluding users. The problem can be extended to
other emerging computing paradigms such Fog and Edge computing
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